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CONFIDENTIALITY, CONSULTATION, AND THE
CHILD CLIENT
Theo S. Liebmann*

INTRODUCTION

Forty years have passed since child abuse was first formally understood to
involve issues of mental health. 1 Today, practitioners and scholars in the field of
child maltreatment 2 recognize both that children's lawyers 3 hold unique
responsibilities which require abilities and skills more commonly ascribed to

mental health professionals, and that competent representation by children's
lawyers consequently requires interdisciplinary consultation. 4 The unique

* Director of Hofstra Child Advocacy Clinic and Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra
University School of Law. B.A., 1990, Yale University; J.D., 1995, Georgetown University Law
Center. I thank Andrew Schepard, Roy Simon and Peter Spiro for their helpful comments and
insights on previous drafts, and Tara Kelly for her thorough research assistance. I extend most
heartfelt thanks to my wife Barbara for her impeccable editing and consistent inspiration and
encouragement.
1. See C.H. Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17, 18-19, 23-24 (1962)
(asserting, among other things, that problem of abused children has mental health implications both
for abused children and their abusers); David Finkelhor, Introduction to THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON
CHILD MALTREATMENT, at xii (John E.B. Myers et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter APSAC
HANDBOOK].

2. "Maltreatment" cases are also called dependency cases, or abuse and neglect cases, and
involve allegations brought by a state agency against parents that they have neglected or abused their
children.
3. This Article focuses on lawyers who represent children pursuant to the definition of "The
Child's Attorney" in the STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN
ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES § A-1 (1996) [hereinafter STANDARDS], available at http://

www.abanet.org/child.childrep.html, which describes such a lawyer as one "who provides legal services
for a child and who owes the same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent
representation to the child as is due an adult client." Id. While the Standards express a clear
preference for the appointment of lawyers who fall under this definition, see id., lawyers are often
appointed as a "Guardian Ad Litem" who must protect the child's interests as an officer of the court,
or some combination of lawyer and guardian ad litem. Id. § A-2. Most jurisdictions are frustratingly
unclear as to which role a lawyer should adopt, and on what it means to represent a child's "best
interests." For a thorough survey of the "chaos" in role definition, see JEAN KOH PETERS,
REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL
DIMENSIONS §§ 2-3(a) to 2-3(b), at 24-33 (1997) [hereinafter REPRESENTING CHILDREN]. The analysis
in this Article only applies to lawyers who are assigned a role consistent with the Standards' definition
of "Child's Attorney."
4. See, e.g., REPRESENTING CHILDREN, supra note 3, §§ 5-4(a), 6-3 to 6-6, at 131-40, 153-91
(advising children's lawyers on importance of, and proper technique for, interdisciplinary

collaboration); Annette R. Appell, Decontextualizing the Child Client: The Efficacy of the Attorney
Client Model for Very Young Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955, 1971 (1996) (proposing
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responsibilities which children's lawyers must fulfill come in the form of ethical
mandates, 5 statutory requirements, 6 and practice guidelines, 7 and range from the
implicit duty to communicate with a client in a developmentally appropriate
manner, 8 to the practice standard of advocating for appropriate social services on
behalf of a client, 9 to the explicit obligation to determine a client's best
interests. 10 Many of these unique responsibilities have interdisciplinary aspects
which require an expertise in the areas of social work, psychology, or psychiatry.
multidisciplinary representation model for very young children); Gerard F. Glynn, Multidisciplinary
Representation of Children: Conflicts Over Disclosures of Client Communications,27 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 617, 618-21 (1994) (analyzing importance of multidisciplinary representation of children); Jean
Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies For Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers
and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client, 1 KY. CHILD. RTS. J. 15, 16 (1991)
[hereinafter Concrete Strategies] (discussing the importance for children's lawyers of working with
consulting social workers); Andrew Schepard, Law School ProgramsSet to Improve Representationof
Children, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 1, 2001, at 3 (describing programs at several law schools which engage in
interdisciplinary representation of children); Deborah Weimer, EthicalJudgment and Interdisciplinary
Collaboration in Custody and Child Welfare Cases, 68 TENN. L. REV. 881, 882 (2001) (discussing
In fact, the benefits of
rejection of traditional adversarial litigation in custody disputes).
interdisciplinary collaboration and consultation are steadily gaining recognition among lawyers in a
wide

variety

of

practices.

See,

e.g.,

AMERICAN

BAR

ASSOCIATION

COMMISSION

ON

MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2000) (proposing ethical

standards for lawyers engaged in multidisciplinary practices), available at http://www.abanet.org/
litigation/issues/mdp/abajrecommendation.pdf; Jeffrey Selbin & Mark Del Monte, A Waiting Room of
Their Own: The Family Care Network as a Model for Providing Gender-Specific Legal Services to
Women with HIV, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 103, 126 (1998) (describing system where legal
advice is one facet of comprehensive service program for HIV-infected women); Louise G. Trubek &
Jennifer J. Farnham, Social Justice Collaboratives: Multidisciplinary Practicesfor People, 7 CLINICAL
L. REV. 227, 229 (2000) (discussing the benefits and challenges of multidisciplinary collaboration for
lawyers and agencies providing services to low and moderate income clients).
5. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, for example, provides: "Any mental or
physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of making a considered judgment on his own
behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his lawyer." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-12 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. See infra Part L.A for a discussion of ethical mandates of
children's lawyers that require consultation with mental health professionals.
6. For example, the statutes of thirty-six states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia
explicitly link the role of the representative for the child to the child's "best interests" or "interest."
REPRESENTING CHILDREN, supra note 3, § 2-3(b), at 30-31. See generally Jean Koh Peters, The Roles
and Content of Best Interests in Client-DirectedLawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1507 (1996) [hereinafter Roles and Content] (describing prevalence of best
interests standard in the representation of children, and exploring proper role of that standard). See
infra Part I.B for a discussion of statutory requirements of children's lawyers that require consultation
with mental health professionals.
7. See, e.g., STANDARDS, supra note 3, § B-5 cmt. (pointing out that child's lawyer must
determine the position to be advocated independently of the client). See infra Part I.C for a discussion
of practice guidelines for children's lawyers that require consultation with mental health professionals.
8. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-12 (requiring lawyer for client under disability such as
age, experience, or intelligence to "obtain from him all possible aid," thus implicitly requiring that
lawyer to be able to communicate with client in manner most developmentally appropriate); see also
STANDARDS, supra note 3, § A-3 (directing child's attorney to structure all communications to account
for child's age, level of education, cultural context, and degree of language acquisition).
9. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, § C-4 (directing child's lawyer to seek appropriate services).
10. See id., § B-5 (setting forth lawyer's duty to determine child client's legal interests).

2002]

CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE CHILD CLIENT

A lawyer for a child in a maltreatment case may need to know, for example,
what cognitive and psycho-social developmental factors she should consider in
her interactions and communications with her client. She may need an
awareness of which available social services might be most appropriate for her
client's needs. In addition, she may need to understand the client's psychological
and emotional well-being in order to factor it appropriately into her
determination of her client's best interests. The interdisciplinary nature of these
considerations means that consultation l with a mental health professional often
will be necessary in order for a children's lawyer to meet her 12 ethical obligation
13
to provide competent representation.
As the use of interdisciplinary consultation becomes increasingly common,
however, lawyers for children must recognize that they may not engage in
unrestricted consultation with mental health professionals. A lawyer whose case
indicates a need for interdisciplinary consultation must conscientiously consider
how the consultation impacts her ethical duty to preserve the confidentiality of
all information relating to the representation of her client. 14 On at least two
levels, consultation poses serious risks that confidential information 5 will be
exposed to third parties improperly. Not only does the consultation by its nature
typically involve the disclosure of confidential information,' 6 but the party being
consulted may have a different confidentiality duty and different standards for
11. For the purposes of this Article, the term "consultation" encompasses any discussion with a
mental health professional related to the lawyer's representation of her client where advice is given or
views are exchanged. See WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 242 (1999) (defining
"consultation" as "[a] conference at which advice is given or views are exchanged"). The term
"mental health professional" will include social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists who are
performing court-assigned forensic duties, are providing ongoing counseling or therapeutic services to
the client or his family, or are retained by the lawyer specifically as a consultant.
12. For purposes of clarity, this Article will use the feminine pronoun for lawyers, and the
masculine pronoun for clients, unless a specific case is being described or analyzed.
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] ("A
Lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client."); MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 6101(A)(1) ("A lawyer shall not... [hiandle a matter which he knows or should know that he is not
competent to handle .... ).
14. These duties are codified in both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. All but eight U.S. jurisdictions have adopted standards based
on the Model Rules. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, preface. The Model Rules provide that "[a]
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation .... " Id., R. 1.6. The Model Code provides that "a lawyer shall not knowingly [rieveal a
confidence or secret of his client." MODEL CODE, supranote 5, DR 4-101(B)(1).
15. The Model Rules consider confidential all information "relating to the representation of a
client." MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6. The Model Code protects the client's "confidence or
secret," MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 4-101(B)(1), defining "confidence" as "information
protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law," id. DR 4-101(A), and "secret" as
"other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held
inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the
client," id.

16. There are circumstances where disclosure of confidential information is not necessary for
fruitful and effective consultation. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the importance of ensuring
that confidential information is disclosed only when necessary.
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any further disclosure of the information, thereby creating risks of even further
17
exposure.
For most clients, a lawyer can circumvent any violations of the
confidentiality duty she owes to her client either by obtaining informed consent' s
prior to a consultation, 19 or through hiring an expert to do the consultation so
that any ensuing communications would be protected from further disclosure by
the attorney-client privilege or the work-product rule. 20 Neither obtaining
informed consent nor hiring an expert, however, offers a lawyer a viable method
for ethical consultation when the lawyer represents a child who does not have
the capacity to provide informed consent. 21 Informed consent fails because, by
definition, the child lacks the capacity to understand the disclosure question and
the consequences of disclosure, and therefore is incapable of providing a
knowledgeable and voluntary waiver of confidentiality. 22 In other words,

17. Social workers, for example,
should protect the confidentiality of all information obtained in the course of professional
service, except for compelling professional reasons. The general expectation that social
workers will keep information confidential does not apply when disclosure is necessary to
prevent serious, foreseeable and imminent harm to a client or other identifiable person.
CODE OF ETHICS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS § 1.07(c) (1999), available at
http://www.ssc.msu.edu/asw/ethics/nasweth.html#107 (emphasis added). Similarly, psychologists may
disclose confidential information without the consent of the individual only as mandated by
law, or where permitted by law for a valid purpose, such as (1) to provide needed
professionals services to the patient..., (2) to obtain appropriate professional consultations,
(3) to protect the patient or client or others from harm, or (4) to obtain payment for
services ....
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT § 5.05 (1992), available at http://
www.apa.org/ethics/codel991.html#5.05. Finally, psychiatrists "may release confidential information
only with the authorization of the patient or under proper legal compulsion." THE PRINCIPLES OF
MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 4(2) (2001),
available at http://www.psych.orglapa-members/medicalethics200l142001.cfm.
For a detailed
discussion of the interplay of these various disclosure standards, see Glynn, supra note 4, at 629-33.
18. "Informed consent" means consent obtained after a disclosure to the client of the purpose,
nature and potential consequences of divulging the confidential information. See MODEL RuLES,
supra note 13, R. 1.6(a) (requiring consultation between the client and lawyer before disclosure);
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 4-2 (requiring "full disclosure" to client for consent to be valid).
19. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 4-101(C)(1) (stating that a lawyer may reveal client
confidences with the consent of the client after full disclosure).
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 68-72 (2000) (governing
attorney-client privilege); id. §§ 87-92 (governing lawyer work-product immunity).
21. The determination of this capacity, as well as the capacity to direct the representation in
general, are extremely difficult issues which are not addressed in this Article. There are several
insightful analyses of the challenges of such determinations, and the ramifications for the role of the
lawyer. See, e.g., REPRESENTING CHILDREN, supra note 3, § 3-2(b)(2), at 53 (suggesting that capacity
is akin to "dimmer switch" rather than "on/off switch", and should be analyzed accordingly); Martin
Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for
Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 79 (1984) (arguing for age cut-off for when children should be deemed
incapacitated); Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to
Choose, 64 FORDAM L. REV. 1873, 1903-14 (1996) (suggesting that child development theory should
be guiding force in determining capacity).
22. See sources cited supra note 21.
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because the client's level of sophistication makes it impossible to advise him fully
of the pros and cons of disclosure, 23 informed consent cannot be obtained.
The attorney-client privilege 24 and the work-product rule 25 also fail to
resolve the disclosure problem because the mental health professionals with
whom lawyers will consult are under a statutory duty to report information
about abuse or neglect. 26 A mental health professional would therefore be
required to report to the appropriate child protective services agency any
information received during a consultation about ongoing or new allegations of
abuse or neglect, thus compromising the protection from disclosure that
information normally retains under the work-product rule.27 Lawyers in
maltreatment cases who represent diminished capacity 28 children do not have the
benefit of either informed consent or the attorney-client privilege and workproduct protections in resolving the potential friction between confidentiality
and consultation. These attorneys thus confront a tension between observing
their responsibility to protect confidential information faithfully and engaging in
interdisciplinary consultation to ensure that their unique duties are performed
diligently.
Part I of this Article uses several examples from actual cases to illustrate
31
30
that many of the statutes, 29 ethical mandates, and representational standards
23. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, 1 THE LAW OF LAWYERING

§ 9-16,

at 9-57 to 9-58 (3d ed. 2001) (defining informed consent as consent obtained after client has been
"advised about the pros and cons of permitting the disclosure, in language appropriate to the client's
level of sophistication").
24. Generally speaking, the attorney-client privilege protects all communications between
"privileged persons," which normally includes the client, the lawyer, and "agents" of the lawyer who
facilitated the representation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 6870 (defining scope of privilege).
25. The work-product rule protects from disclosure all material prepared in anticipation of
litigation by a lawyer, or by any "agent" associated with her, such as a consulting mental health
professional. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b)(3) (2002) (protecting materials prepared by party's attorney or
consultant); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947) (holding that neither Rule 26 nor any other
rule of discovery contemplated production of material prepared in anticipation of litigation); HAZARD
& HODES, supra note 23, § 9.14, at 9-47 to 9-48 (stating that this protection extends to expert
consultants, such as mental health professionals, retained by lawyer).
26. See Glynn, supra note 4, at 639-41 (discussing mandatory reporting laws); Gail L. Zellman &
C. Christine Fair, Preventing and Reporting Abuse, in APSAC HANDBOOK, supra note 1, 449, 451
(noting that almost every state's reporting laws cover mental health professionals). See infra Part IV
for a discussion of how this duty impacts disclosure decisions by lawyers for children.
27. In addition, note that in many jurisdictions no psychologist-patient, social worker-client, or
physician-patient privilege exists in maltreatment cases. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(vii)
(McKinney Supp. 2002) (stating that any mental health professional called as witness in maltreatment
case will be compelled to testify regardless of patient's wishes).
28. For the purposes of this Article, the term "diminished capacity child" or "diminished capacity
client" means those child clients who do not possess full capacity to provide informed consent.
29. See infra Part L.A for a discussion of ethical mandates of children's lawyers that require
consultation with mental health professionals.
30. See infra Part 1.B for a discussion of statutory requirements of children's lawyers that require
consultation with mental health professionals.
31. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of practice guidelines for children's lawyers that require
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which govern the actions of lawyers for children often implicitly require an
expertise in mental health that can be obtained only through consultation with
mental health professionals. Part II examines what confidentiality duty lawyers
for diminished capacity children owe their clients, and under what conditions
ethical rules might permit the disclosure of confidential information by such
lawyers to consulting mental health professionals. 32 Part II concludes that the
disclosure of confidential information to a mental health consultant is ethical if it
is necessary to meet an explicit representational responsibility of the lawyer, and
if it is done in a manner which respects to the maximum degree possible the
client's developing interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the information.
Part III assesses the ethical viability of allowing lawyers for diminished capacity
children to disclose information to consulting mental health professionals when a
lawyer feels such disclosure would serve the best interests of her client. 33 This
Part revisits some of the case examples from Part I to illustrate the deficits of this
"best interests" standard when applied to confidentiality and to highlight how
the standard fails to follow the conditions discussed in Part 11. 34 Finally, Part IV
proposes a new standard to ensure that lawyers for diminished capacity children
make their disclosure decisions on ethically acceptable grounds and carry forth
those disclosures in an ethically responsible manner, pursuant to the conditions
35
arrived at in Part 11.
I. THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS FOR CHILDREN IN
MALTREATMENT CASES WHICH REQUIRE CONSULTATION WITH MENTAL

HEALTH PROFESSIONALS

Many ethical mandates, statutory requirements, and practice standards
related to the representation of children in maltreatment cases exert pressures
on lawyers to consult with mental health professionals in order to fulfill their
professional responsibilities. This Part of the Article identifies the mandates,36
requirements, 37 and standards 38 which exert those pressures, and uses case
examples 39 to illustrate how they implicitly require an expertise in mental health

consultation with mental health professionals.
32. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the rationale for the duty of confidentiality, its
exceptions, and how the duty applies in the representation of children.
33. See infra Part III for a discussion of the best interests standard for disclosure.
34. See infra notes 162-80 and accompanying text for an analysis of these examples under the
best interests standard for disclosure.
35. See infra Part IV for a detailed presentation of the new standard.
36. See infra Part L.A for a discussion of ethical mandates of children's lawyers that require
consultation with mental health professionals.
37. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of statutory requirements of children's lawyers that require
consultation with mental health professionals.

38. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of practice guidelines for children's lawyers that require
consultation with mental health professionals.
39. The examples are all drawn from the author's experience representing children in
maltreatment cases as a staff attorney at the Legal Aid Society's Juvenile Rights Division in New York
City, and as Director of the Hofstra University Child Advocacy Clinic. All identifying information has
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40
which frequently can be obtained only through interdisciplinary consultation.

A. Ethical Mandates
Both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct dictate special ethical responsibilities for attorneys for
clients with a diminished capacity to make decisions for themselves. Ethical
Consideration 7-11 of the Code states that "[t]he responsibilities of a lawyer may
vary according to the intelligence, experience, mental condition or age of a
client ....
",41 Ethical Consideration 7-12 elaborates on these responsibilities:
Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable
of making a considered judgment on his own behalf casts additional
responsibilities upon his lawyer.... If a client under disability has no
legal representative, his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings
to make decisions on behalf of the client. If the client is capable of
understanding the matter in question or of contributing to the
advancement of his interests, regardless of whether he is legally
disqualified from performing certain acts, the lawyer should obtain
from him all possible aid. If the disability of a client and the lack of a
legal representative compel the lawyer to make decisions for his client,
the lawyer should consider all circumstances then prevailing and act
42
with care to safeguard and advance the interests of his client.
Model Rule 1.14(a) further addresses the duties of lawyers for clients with
diminished capacity:
When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of
minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall,
as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer
43
relationship with the client.
These ethical mandates implicitly require consultation with mental health
professionals on at least three levels. First and foremost, lawyers for clients with
diminished capacity must determine whether the client's "disability" renders him
incapable of making a "considered judgement on his own behalf," 44 or impairs
his ability to make "adequately considered decisions in connection with the
representation." 45 The assessment of this capacity is not one which a lawyer
competently can make without evaluating the client's developmental,
intellectual, and emotional functioning. Often, only a mental health professional
will have the training to perform the level of evaluation needed to make an

been changed.
40. See infra Part IV for an analysis of why training on mental health issues for children's
lawyers, while providing some expertise, and while crucial to improving the quality of representation,
does not obviate the need for consultation with a trained mental health professional.
41. MODEL CODE, supranote 5, EC 7-11 (emphasis added).
42. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-12.
43. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.14(a) (emphasis added).
44. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-12.
45. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.14(a).
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informed assessment.
Second, a lawyer for an incapacitated client must "obtain from [her client]
all possible aid."'47 The most common way to obtain that aid is through verbal
communication. Children at different developmental levels, however, have
widely different abilities to understand certain types of questions. 48 Thus, when
a client is a young or developmentally delayed child, a lawyer often will require
the assistance of a mental health professional trained in child development to
frame questions in a manner which will effectively elicit critical information and
opinions.
Finally, when making decisions on behalf of an incapacitated client, the
lawyer should "consider all circumstances then prevailing" 49 before deciding
what course of action is in the client's best interests. 50 In the realm of child abuse
and neglect, those circumstances will almost certainly include an assessment of
the psychological, emotional, and developmental ramifications of the decision at
issue. 51 For example, when deciding whether to support a mentally ill parent's
application to have a child returned to her care, a lawyer will need an
understanding of, among other things: the parent's current emotional and
psychological state; the parent's prognosis; the impact of the mental illness on
the ability to parent; and, the child's bonds with his parent and with his current
custodian. 52 Consulting with a mental health professional will be crucial for the
lawyer to consider intelligently how issues like these should impact the position
she will take on behalf of her client.
The following example illustrates how these ethical responsibilities can
come to bear in an actual case:

46. There will, of course, be situations where no training will be necessary to perform that
assessment. When a client is an infant, for example, the capacity of the client to make any decision
related to the case will be obvious. See infra note 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
providing of direction even by the infant.
47. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-12.
48. See Nancy E. Walker & Matthew Nguyen, Interviewing the Child Witness: The Do's and the
Don't's, The How's and the Why's, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1587, 1591-92 (1996) (discussing

importance of developmentally appropriate language during interviews of children).
49. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-12.
50. For one proposal of what circumstances to consider in making best interests decisions, and
how to consider those circumstances, see Proceedingsof the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children:Recommendations of the Conference,64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1310-11

(1996) [hereinafter Recommendations of the Conference]. The 1996 Fordham Conference gathered a
large number of the leading scholars and practitioners from around the United States to discuss many
of the ethical issues unique to the representation of children. The Conference working groups made
numerous recommendations which have had wide-ranging impact on the representation of children.
The Conference was, and continues to be, a truly galvanizing event in the progression of the study of
the ethical issues relevant to the practice of lawyers of children.
51. See Concrete Strategies, supranote 4, at 16 (describing circumstances lawyers usually consider
in child abuse and neglect decisions).
52. See Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 50, at 1311 (recommending that lawyers
consult experts for guidance when case involving child's interests becomes too complex).
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The Case of Tara G.
Tara is a fifteen year-old girl who has been placed in foster care pursuant to
allegations that her father and mother beat her regularly.53 According to the
petition filed against the parents, Tara has the mental capacity of a five-year-old
child. The case originally came to the attention of the departmentof social services
when Tara went to her special educationalschool with severe bruising aroundher
eyes. When her teacher asked how she got the bruises, Tara said that her father
punched her while her mother held her down. Tara said she had only been
punched two or three times before, but that she was beaten with a belt a lot. A
caseworker later discovered evidence of old belt buckle marks around Tara's torso
and legs. Tara told the caseworker that she was beaten whenever she was "bad."
When asked, Tara explained that she was "bad" whenever she did not do her
chores quickly enough. Since being placed in foster care six weeks ago, Tara has
been visiting with her parents every week at the department of social services
offices under the supervision of a caseworker. According to the caseworker, the
visits go well. After initial awkwardness at each visit, both parents talk and play
with Tara. They seem very patient with Tara. Both Tara and her parents cry
whenever the visits end and they have to say goodbye. Tara's foster family is
located in a new school district and has received special trainingin meeting Tara's
specialneeds. Because they are the only availablefosterfamily which has received
such training, Tara could not be placed anywhere else closer to her school. She
has been enrolled in special educational classes at a different school which are
similar to the classes she attended at her old school. When Tara's lawyer meets
with her, she immediately notices that Tara speaks very slowly and has trouble
enunciating. Tara says that she wants to go back and live with her parents and
return to her old school. She says she misses herparents and her old teachers a lot,
and that she is teased all the time at her new school. When the lawyer asks Tara
about the foster family, Tara smiles and rocks back and forth while hugging
herself The lawyer has to go to court in a week for a conference on the issue of
whether Tara should remain in foster care pending the resolution of the case. The
judge will expect Tara's lawyer to have a position on the issue of temporary
placementpending case resolution.
First, Tara's lawyer must determine whether or not Tara is, in fact,
incapacitated. 54 If Tara is not incapacitated, then the lawyer must abide by the
regular ethical provisions relating to decision-making authority. 55 In some cases,
this determination may be obvious and no consultation is required. 56 When
representing a newborn infant, for example, no lawyer would need assistance to
53. For a survey of studies concerning the prevalence, significance, treatment, and mental health
implications of physical abuse, see David J. Kolko, Child Physical Abuse, in APSAC HANDBOOK,
supra note 1, 21, 21.
54. See Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 50, at 1312 ("[A] lawyer must engage in
additional fact finding to determine whether the child has or may develop the capacity to direct the

lawyer's action.").
55. MODEL RULES, supranote 13, R. 1.2(a); MODEL CODE, supranote 5, DR 7-107(A)(1).
56. See Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 50, at 1313 (indicating that child's
developmental stage is primary factor in assessing capacity).
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determine the client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions. 57 Once
the client can communicate with her lawyer, however, the decision becomes
more difficult, until the point when the client clearly does possess the emotional
and intellectual ability to make adequately considered decisions-for example, a
bright seventeen-year-old who is deciding whether she wishes to reside with her
mother or her father. 58 Tara's lawyer must determine where Tara falls along this
"capacity spectrum" with respect to the decision about temporary placement. 59
Although the petition says that Tara has the capacity of a five-year-old, that
might not be accurate. 60 Even if it is accurate, Tara's lawyer must still determine
whether Tara has the capacity to make an "adequately considered decision"
about her temporary placement. A mental health professional's analysis of
psychological evaluations, school records, special education reports, and
recorded observations of the visits between Tara and her parents will be
invaluable to a thorough and accurate assessment of Tara's capacity by her
61
lawyer.
Second, the Code requires that attorneys for incapacitated clients analyze
"all circumstances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance
the interests of his client." 62 This mandate implicitly requires that Tara's lawyer
consult with a mental health professional. In order to analyze all circumstances
relating to the issue of temporary placement, Tara's lawyer must look at, among
other things: the potential emotional and psychological impact on Tara of further
separation from her parents and school; the potential emotional and
psychological impact on Tara of possible future beatings; whether the new school

57. While such a client will obviously not be able to provide verbal direction on representational
matters to the lawyer, it can still be invaluable to observe such clients. See REPRESENTING CHILDREN,
supra note 3, § 3-2(b)(2), at 53 ("Even a newborn child evinces a personality, a level of health, physical
characteristics, a gestation and birth history, and a family context and history which distinguishes her
from the next newborn client."). In fact, visiting with child clients of any age is both explicitly and
implicitly required by certain practice standards. See, e.g., STANDARDS, supra note 3, C-1
("[I]rrespective of the child's age, the child's attorney should visit with the child .... ); NEW YORK
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, LAW GUARDIAN REPRESENTATION STANDARDS § A-2 cmt. (1996) ("[Tjhe

attorney may always observe his or her young client. The child's demeanor, possible health and the
child's inter-action with the environment and with persons can thereby be evaluated."), availableat
http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/PublicResources/Programs and Resources/Guide_
toRepresentingChildren/ Guide toRepresentingChildren.htm.
58. See Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 50, at 1313 (listing factors to be
considered in assessing capacity).
59. See REPRESENTING CHILDREN, supra note 3, § 3-2(b)(2), at 53-54 (suggesting that children's

capacity to contribute to representation should be analyzed as spectrum of how much they can
contribute, rather than assuming that lack of full ability to contribute means child client cannot
contribute at all).
60. Children's lawyers are required to make independent assessments of the veracity of
allegations by child protection agencies. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 9 ("[T]he child's attorney
should conduct thorough, continuing, and independent investigations and discovery ... ").
61. See Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 50, at 1313 ("In making the decision
regarding capacity, the lawyer should seek guidance from appropriate professionals .... ).
62. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-12 (emphasis added). The protection of interests is also a
statutory obligation in many states, and is analyzed in Part I.B, infra.
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is sufficiently meeting Tara's special educational needs; and, if the new school is
inadequate, what impact that might have on Tara's intellectual development.
Like most lawyers, however, Tara's lawyer has not received any sort of
specialized training that would provide her with the knowledge or expertise to
analyze these issues, all of which are extremely significant "circumstances" that
must be considered before acting on behalf of her client. In order truly to meet
the admonition to "act with care," any analysis of these issues must include
consultation with a mental health professional who does have that specialized
63
training.
Finally, Tara's attorney will have to consult with mental health professionals
in order to meet the ethical obligation which requires her to obtain from Tara
"all possible aid" if Tara is "capable of understanding the matter in question or
of contributing to the advancement of [her] interests ...."64 Generally,
65
interviews are the primary vehicle for obtaining information from a client.
Incapacitated clients like Tara, however, frequently have a limited ability to
communicate. 66 Especially when working with much younger or severely
disabled clients, a lawyer for children may need a mental health professional's
assistance in determining how best to elicit information from her client. 67 By
requiring an attorney to obtain from the client all possible aid, the Rules
implicitly require the attorney to seek that assistance. In Tara's case, her
attorney may have particular trouble interpreting Tara's reactions when she is
asked about her foster family. A mental health consultant could provide
interpretations which would inform the attorney's decisions as she develops her
position on temporary placement.
B. Statutory Requirements
Thirty-six states, plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, explicitly
require lawyers for children in abuse and neglect cases to represent the child's
interests or best interests in court.68 In order to conduct a thorough and
63. See Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 50, at 1311 ("There will be cases in which

the analysis becomes too complex and lawyers should consult experts for guidance.... [T]he retained
consultant is sometimes the optimal, and only ethically acceptable, guide.").
64. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-12.
65. See generally David A. Binder & Susan C. Price, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:
A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977) (defining interviewing as lawyer interaction with client to
identify client's problem and gather information about solution).

66. But see Recommendations of the Conference,supra note 50, at 1304 (recommending that even
lawyers for nonverbal clients should meet with them and, where possible, see them in their living
environment).

67. See id. (recommending use of social workers and psychologists in contacts with pre-verbal
children); see also Karen J. Saywitz, Developmental Underpinnings of Children's Testimony, in
CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY: A HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND FORENSIC PRACTICE 3,

3-4 (Helen L. Westcott et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY] (describing how
cognitive, social, and emotional skills of children are often poorly suited to needs of legal system).
68. REPRESENTING

CHILDREN, supra note 3, § 2-3(b), at 30-31; see also 42 U.S.C.
(2000) (requiring appointment of guardian ad litem "to make
recommendations to the court concerning the best interests of the child").

§ 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix)(II)
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objective determination, assessment, and balancing of the various interests of an
incapacitated child client which the lawyer might advance in court, lawyers may
often be compelled to consult with mental health professionals. 69 Consider the
following example:
The Case of Roger M.
An attorney is assigned to represent Roger, a four-year-old child who has
allegedly been subjected to excessive corporalpunishment.70 Roger is temporarily
placed in the custody of his maternal grandparents. His parents are permitted to
visit him there so long as one of the grandparentsis present. Roger's parents make
an admission in court that they have hit Roger with an electrical cord on his legs
and back to discipline him, and that the beatings have left marks which have lasted
for days. The case is adjournedfor a dispositionalhearing to decide, among other
things, Roger's placement over the course of the next year. In preparationfor the
hearing,the attorney arrangesfor Roger to be brought into her office for a second
interview. Roger adamantly insists that he wants to go back to live with his parents
as soon as possible. He says that if he cannot stay with them, he would be happy
staying with his grandparents. Roger says he heardfrom a friend that bad kids are
sent to foster care, and asks what foster care is. The attorney explains foster care,
and Roger tells the attorney that he never, ever wants to go to foster care. When
the attorney asks how the visits between him and his parents go, Roger says they
go well most of the time, but that sometimes he does not like them. After the
attorney asks for specifics on what he does not like, Roger reluctantly admits that
his parents still hit him with an electric cord at the visits. Roger shows the attorney
some marks on his legs. Roger tells the attorney she cannot tell anyone else about
the new marks. He also says his grandparentsalready know about them. When
the attorney speaks to the grandparents,they admit that they know about the
continued beatings, but are intimidated by the parents and reluctant to interfere.
Roger's lawyer now must determine her position on Roger's placement and the
nature of his visitation with his parents before the next court date. Her assessment
of Roger's interests will determine that position.
A thorough assessment of Roger's interests will be nearly impossible for a
lawyer to make without consultation with a mental health professional. While
the lawyer is aware of Roger's adamant statements against being placed in foster
care, for example, she does not have the expertise to assess how psychologically
damaging it truly would be for Roger to be placed away from his extended
family. Similarly, while the lawyer knows that Roger would be at some risk of
continued beatings if he remained with his grandparents, she does not have the
expertise to assess the emotional toll continued beatings would take on Roger.

69. In addition, even where a lawyer is advocating for the wishes of a child client, it will be
important to assess the best interests of the client in order both to properly counsel the client, and to
incorporate the assessment into their advocacy. See Roles and Content, supra note 6, at 1513-24
(describing importance of determining best interests even when child client is directing the
representation).
70. For a survey of studies concerning the prevalence, significance, treatment, and mental health
implications of physical abuse, see Kolko, supra note 53, at 21.
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Consultation with a mental health professional might provide much, if not all, of
that information. 71 At a minimum, the lawyer could explain the facts of Roger's
case to a psychologist and gather information on how children Roger's age
typically respond when contact with family is limited, and on the potential
ramifications to Roger's emotional well-being if he were exposed to continued
corporal punishment. If Roger had previously been evaluated or treated by a
mental health professional, his lawyer could engage in an even more useful
consultation by obtaining an assessment from that individual specific to Roger
72
on the issues of removal from family and exposure to corporal punishment.
C. PracticeStandards
The American Bar Association's Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who
Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases contemplate at least two other

basic obligations of a child's attorney which require the expertise of a mental
health professional: the duty of the lawyer to develop and present her position
on all issues relevant to the representation; 73 and the identification, and
appropriate pursuit, of services for her client. 74 The case examples of Lisa M.
and Jason S. illustrate how these obligations implicitly require such expertise.
The Case of Lisa M.
75
Lisa is a four-year-old child whose father allegedly sexually abused her.
Lisa's mother and father are divorced and live separately. Lisa spends weekends

71. In addition, without any consultation with experts, there exists the risk that a lawyer will rely
solely on her own values and beliefs to determine what their client's interests are. See Concrete
Strategies, supra note 4, at 16 (noting that "[w]ithout expert input, there is a substantial danger that
attorneys might substitute their own personal values for a more educated determination of the child's
welfare"). The Standards of Practicefor Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse & Neglect Cases
specifically caution against this problem:
A lawyer who is required to determine the child's interests is functioning in a nontraditional
role by determining the position to be advocated independently of the client. The lawyer
should base the position, however, on objective criteria concerning the child's needs and
interests, and not merely on the lawyer's personal values, philosophies, and experiences....
The lawyer may seek the advice and consultation of experts and other knowledgeable people
in both determining and weighing such needs and interests.
STANDARDS, supra note 3, § B-5 cmt. (citations omitted). There are of course, situations where
consultation will hardly be necessary to determine a child's interests. Professor Peters gives the
example of determining the best interests of a child who has been abandoned at birth and has lived in
the same pre-adoptive home the child's whole life. Concrete Strategies,supra note 4, at 25 n.12.
72. See REPRESENTING CHILDREN, supra note 3, § 5-4(a)(2)(i), at 133-36 (describing benefits and

limitations of consulting with expert already involved in therapeutic relationship with client).
73. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, § B-1(6) (requiring attorney to develop theory and strategy of
case); id. § D-4 cmt. (requiring attorney to be prepared and participate fully on behalf of child in every
hearing).
74. See id. § B-1(7) (requiring attorney to identify appropriate family and professional services
for child); id. § C-4 (requiring attorney to seek appropriate services); id. § C-5 (requiring attorney to
assure child with special needs receives appropriate services).
75. For a survey of studies concerning the prevalence, significance, treatment, and mental health
implications of sexual abuse, see Lucy Berliner & Diana M. Elliott, Sexual Abuse of Children, in
APSAC HANDBOOK, supra note 1, 55, 55.
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with herfather. The allegationscame to light when Mrs. M. was bathing Lisa and
noticed redness around Lisa's vaginal area. When Mrs. M. asked what happened,
Lisa pointed to her groin and said "Daddy touched me there. It hurt, and he told
me not to tell." Lisa has been seen by a doctor, who said that there was redness,
but no definitive physical signs of sexual abuse. A few weeks after seeing the
doctor, Lisa was interviewed by a caseworker. Lisa denied that her father had
ever touched her vagina, except when he was giving her a bath. Lisa has also been
seen by a psychologist with an expertise in identifying and treating child sexual
abuse. The psychologist's report concluded that Lisa's statements and behaviors
are consistent with those of a child who has been sexually abused. The father's
attorney arranged for the father to be seen by a psychologist, as well. That
psychologist stated to Lisa's attorney that the father exhibits none of the
personality traits or behaviors that are normally associated with a parent who
sexually abuses his child. He also stated that, based on his review of the first
psychologist's report and his interview of the father, he believes that this case is an
example of "parental alienation syndrome,"7 6 where one parent influences the
child to make untrue abuse allegations against the other parent. The trial is
approaching in two weeks, and Lisa's attorney is preparing her summation and
her cross examination questions for the doctor, caseworker,and psychologist.
Lisa's attorney, pursuant to the ABA guidelines, must develop and present
a position at the upcoming trial. 77 Unlike a lawyer who represent clients with the
capacity to direct the position taken by their representative, however, she must
determine her position based not on the direction of her client, but based on an
assessment of Lisa's interests. 78 Establishing Lisa's interest with respect to a
finding of abuse against her father will hinge largely, if not entirely, on an
assessment of the veracity of the allegations. A finding when the allegations are
false could further cement Lisa's "memories" of allegations that are not true and
could lead to long-term psychological problems; 79 a dismissal of the case if the

76. See Carol S. Bruch, ParentalAlienation Syndrome and ParentalAlienation: Getting It Wrong
in Child Custody Cases, 35 FAM. L.Q. 527 passim (2001) (discussing theoretical and practical problems
with "parental alienation syndrome" and its alarmingly wide acceptance by lawyers and courts despite
its lack of scientific foundations).
77. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, §§ B-1(6) (requiring attorney to develop theory and strategy
of case), D-4 cmt. (requiring attorney to be prepared and participate fully on behalf of child in every
hearing).
78. Any responsible assessment of Lisa's interests will, of course, depend at least in some part on
her stated position. See DONALD N. DUQUETrE, ADVOCATING FOR THE CHILD IN PROTECTION
PROCEEDINGS: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATES 32
(1990) (urging that "[i]n every case and at every age, the child's point of view should be considered by
the advocate...."); ANN M. HARALAMBIE, THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING
CHILDREN IN CUSTODY, ADOPTION, AND PROTECTION CASES 28 (1993) (asserting that eliciting
child's feelings, wishes, and beliefs is crucial step in representing children); REPRESENTING CHILDREN,
supra note 3, § 3-2(b)(2), at 53-54 (suggesting that children's capacity to contribute to representation
should be analyzed as spectrum of how much they can contribute, rather than assuming that lack of
full ability to contribute means child client cannot contribute at all).
79. See generally Kathy Pezdek & Tiffany Hinz, The Constructionof False Events in Memory, in
CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY, supra note 67, 99 (describing six studies on implantation of false memories).
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allegations are true, and the subsequent continuation of weekend visits with her
father, could lead to further sexual abuse and long-term physical and
psychological harm. Thus, in this case, as in many child maltreatment cases
involving diminished capacity clients, the lawyer's theory development first and
foremost will require a determination of the truth of the allegations.
The assessment of the veracity of the allegations here, as in many abuse and
neglect cases, cannot competently be made by an attorney alone. The facts
before Lisa's attorney present a complicated picture which may be nearly
impossible to assess without the assistance of a mental health professional. Lisa
has made and recanted statements alleging sexual abuse; as in many sexual abuse
cases, there is no physical evidence to support the allegations, and psychologists
have rendered opinions which appear to contradict each other. Consultation
with a mental health professional will allow Lisa's attorney to perform an
informed evaluation of these issues, and formulate a position on the veracity of
the allegations. The consultant can provide guidance on the significance of
Lisa's recantation;80 on whether or not the first psychologist followed
appropriate procedures before rendering her opinion; 8t and on the acceptance
within the mental health community of "parental alienation syndrome" as a
82
legitimate diagnosis.
Once Lisa's lawyer has established her position, she must develop direct
examination and cross examination questions, and prepare a summation, all of
which support that position. 83 Consultation will prove invaluable in the
development of "friendly" cross examination questions for the psychologist
whose determination the attorney supports, and "hostile" cross examination
questions which expose the weaknesses of the determination of the other
psychologist. 84 While a lawyer may attempt to prepare these questions without
the benefit of consultation-for example, based solely on her reading of
materials in the area-this is an extremely risky strategy which presumes the
lawyer on her own will develop a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of the
85
mental health issues to develop an effective cross.

80. See Berliner & Elliott, supra note 75, at 59 (quoting studies that show that four percent to
twenty-two percent of children recant true allegations of sexual abuse).
81. See Suzanne M. Sgroi et al., Validation of Child Sexual Abuse, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL
INTERVENTION IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 39-78 (Suzanne M. Sgroi ed., 1982) (describing proper

procedures for assessing whether child's claims of sexual abuse are consistent with expected behavioral
and verbal indicators).
82. See Bruch, supra note 76, passim (attacking that legitimacy).
83. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, § D-3 to D-11 (describing duties of child's attorney's at
hearing); see also MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.1 (requiring thoroughness and preparation);
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Canon 6 (requiring competent representation).
84. See THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 337 (4th ed. 1996) (indicating crucial
importance of retaining one's own expert to be able to understand and properly cross another party's
expert).
85. Id.; see also MODEL CODE EC 6-3 (noting that "[piroper preparation and representation may
require the association by the lawyer of professionals in other disciplines").
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The Case of Jason S.
Jason, a four-and-one-half-year-old boy, was recently removed from his
parents' care and placed in non-kinship foster care. Jason was removed after his
86
parents were charged with using drugs while responsiblefor caring for Jason,
and engaging in domestic violence in Jason's presence.8 7 According to the child
protective agency, Jason'sparents engaged in fist fights, and threatened each other
with knives, while Jason was in the room. They also have both admitted that they
use cocaine about twice a week. Jason's seven-year-old brother, Sam, was
removed from their parents at birth after he was born with a positive blood
toxicology for cocaine. Sam subsequently has been adopted by his paternal aunt.
The department of social services has referred both of Jason'sparents to domestic
violence counseling and an out-patient drug program. Jason's lawyer determined
that the domestic violence program involves group counseling with a psychologist
once a week, and the drug program involves weekly group counseling and weekly
random drug tests. Jason has had trouble adjusting to his foster home, and has
been seeing an agency psychologist who is evaluating both this difficulty and the
effects on Jason of witnessing domestic violence. The case is due in court next
week for a report on how the parents are progressingand for the formulation of a
long-term plan for service provision to the parents.
Jason's lawyer has an obligation under the ABA Standards to advocate for
88
the provision of appropriate social services for her client and her client's family.
A mental health consultant's input is crucial in order for Jason's lawyer to
determine whether the services currently being offered to Jason and his family
are appropriate, and what additional or different services, if any, should be
sought. Is the parents' weekly domestic violence group counseling, without any
individual therapy, sufficient for the level of violence reported between them?
Should Jason and his family be engaging in family counseling? Is the agency
psychologist providing the level of treatment that Jason requires? All of these
questions are most appropriately answered with the input of a mental health
professional.
II. THE CONFIDENTIALITY DUTY OF LAWYERS FOR DIMINISHED CAPACITY
CLIENTS

Consultation with mental health professionals, so important to the effective
representation of child clients, unfortunately creates a tension with one of the
foremost ethical duties of lawyers, the duty not to disclose confidential

86. For a survey of studies concerning the prevalence, significance, treatment, and mental health
implications of drug abuse by parents, see Susan J. Kelley, Child Maltreatment in the Context of
Substance Abuse, in APSAC HANDBOOK, supra note 1, 105,105.
87. See Sandra A. Graham-Bermann, Child Abuse in the Context of Domestic Violence, in
APSAC HANDBOOK, supra note 1, 119, 119 (surveying studies concerning prevalence, significance,
treatment, and mental health implications of domestic violence in families).
88. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, § C-4 (directing that "[clonsistent with the child's wishes, the
child's attorney should seek appropriate services ...to protect the child's interests and to implement a
service plan.").
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information to other parties.8 9 For a consultation with a mental health
professional to be effective, some confidential information, broadly defined as
any information relating to the representation of the client, 90 must nearly always
be disclosed. 91 Furthermore, once the information is disclosed to the consultant,
that professional's different standards for further disclosure to other persons 92 or
agencies 93 come into play, thereby placing the information at risk of even greater
exposure.
The disclosure of confidential information to the consultant,
therefore, as well as the possible ramifications of that disclosure, directly conflict
with the confidentiality duty which lawyers owe to their clients.
Most lawyers can avoid this conflict by obtaining informed consent 94 from
their clients to share information with a consultant. 95 Lawyers who represent
children without the capacity to provide this consent, however, obviously cannot
resolve the conflict this way. Therefore, if the confidentiality duty applies to
these children's lawyers in the same manner that it applies to other attorneys, the
lawyers face an intractable ethical quandary. Either they must faithfully observe
the confidentiality duty at the expense of consultations crucial to meeting their
representational responsibilities, or they must diligently consult with mental
89. See MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6 ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
); MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 4-101(B)(1)("[A] lawyer shall not
representation of a client ....
knowingly [r]eveal a confidence or secret of his client."). Both the confidentiality duty established in
professional ethical mandates and the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine established
under rules of evidence protect the confidentiality of information exchanged between lawyer and
client. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6 cmt. 5. The attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine, however, only apply where evidence is sought from the lawyer, as a witness or through the
production of documents. Id.; see also Glynn, supra note 4, at 622 n.14 (providing details on
prevalence of attorney-client privilege). Thus, while the privilege and the work-product doctrine limit
the right of others to compel a lawyer to disclose information, the confidentiality duty more broadly
limits the freedom of lawyers to disclose information without client consent.
90. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6(a). The Model Code protection covers "confidences,"
defined as information protected by the attorney-client privilege, as well as "secrets," defined as
"information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or
the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client."
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 4-101(A). Note that neither the Rules nor the Code limits protection
to identifying information.
91. Consultation can, of course, sometimes be done on such general terms that no information
relating to the representation is actually disclosed. Whenever possible, therefore, lawyers should limit
the specificity of information disclosed. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the importance of limiting
the amount of information disclosed during consultation to what is absolutely necessary.
92. See supranote 17 for the contents of those standards.
93. See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The
Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203,212-17 & nn.36-40 (1992) (providing
overview of statutes that require mental health professionals to report to child protection agencies any
information they receive which causes them to suspect a child is being neglected or abused); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney 2000) (exemplifying mandatory reporting statute which covers mental
health professionals).
94. See supranote 18 for the definition of informed consent.
95. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
the representation of the client unless the client consents after consultation ....) (emphasis added);
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 4-101(C)(1) ("A lawyer may reveal [c]onfidences or secrets with the
consent of the client or clients affected, but only after full disclosure to them.").
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health professionals to meet their representational responsibilities while
breaching their confidentiality duty.
This Part of the Article analyzes the rationale behind the confidentiality
duty and its exceptions generally, and the applicability of that rationale to
lawyers for diminished capacity child clients. 96 This Part describes how the
diminished capacity child client has a unique, constantly developing interest in
confidentiality, and concludes that the disclosure of confidential information to a
mental health consultant can be ethical if it is necessary to meet an explicit
representational responsibility of the lawyer, and if it is done in a manner which
respects to the maximum degree possible the child's developing interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of the information.
A. The Rationale for the Confidentiality Duty and Its Exceptions
In order to analyze how the confidentiality duty applies to lawyers for
diminished capacity clients, it is first useful to examine the rationale behind the
duty. Both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibit a lawyer from disclosing confidential
information gained in the course of representing her client. 97 The duty to
maintain confidentiality, as well as the attorney-client privilege, provide
powerful proscriptions against any kind of disclosure which does not fall under
certain enumerated exceptions. These proscriptions are generally justified by
the following syllogism: a lawyer must have complete and truthful information in
order competently to counsel and advocate for her client; a client will provide
complete and truthful information only if he is assured that the lawyer will not
and cannot disclose that information without his consent; therefore, in order to
assure competent representation, lawyers must be prohibited from disclosing
98
confidential information without a client's consent.
The first part of the syllogism presumes that, both as an advocate and as a
counselor, 99 a lawyer must know all that his client knows concerning the facts of

96. See supra note 28 for a definition of diminished capacity child client.
97. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 13, R. 1.6 ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client .... ); MODEL CODE, supra note 5,DR 4-101(B)(1)("(A] lawyer shall not
knowingly [rleveal a confidence or secret of his client.").
98. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 5, 27 (1975)
(stating that if confidence not kept, client would not feel free to confide fully, leaving lawyer unable to
fulfill duty to ascertain all relevant facts). While this syllogism is the basis for the confidentiality rules
in the Model Code and Model Rules, there are certainly other reasons why confidentiality should be
observed. See, e.g., HAZARD & HODES, supra note 23, § 9.2, at 9-8 (stating that "[b]eyond []pragmatic
and utilitarian concerns, the confidentiality principle can stand on a moral base of its own" and
presenting moral reasons); Bruce M. Landesman, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship,
in THE GOOD LAWYER 191 passim (David Luban ed. 1984) (arguing for moral reasons for protection
of confidentiality). In addition, some scholars question the soundness of the syllogism. See, e.g., Fred
C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REv. 351, 376-82 (1989) (discussing study
showing that clients put far less stock in confidentiality than lawyers believe that they do).
99. The Model Rules specifically refer to the duties of a lawyer to be both a counselor, MODEL
RULES 2.1, and an advocate, MODEL RuLES 3.1-3.9.
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the case in order to provide competent representation."° ° As an advocate, the
lawyer must know as many facts about the case as possible in order to perform
an independent professional assessment of which facts are relevant or irrelevant,
helpful or harmful, in the pursuit of the representational goals. That ability to
evaluate the relevance or significance of particular facts is one which a client
10 1
ordinarily does not possess.
As a counselor, a lawyer can give proper advice only if she has complete
information about a client and his situation. The most persuasive example of the
importance of informed counseling is a lawyer's ability, through proper counsel
and advice, to prevent harms or illegal acts which a client may be planning to
commit. 10 2 When a client discloses such information, a lawyer may be able to
help him find other ways to deal with his problem. In some cases, the client
might be the potential recipient of the harm. Again, if the client fully discloses
information, the lawyer will be in a much better position to provide advice on
how to protect the client from the harm, or on what options are available to the
client to stop or prevent the harm. With full disclosure, therefore, lawyers have
10 3
an increased ability to help protect both clients and society from harms.
The second part of the syllogism asserts that, without a feeling of trust and
confidence in his lawyer, a client will not disclose information in the fully
complete or truthful manner necessary for competent representation. A client
may withhold information for any number of reasons, including embarrassment
or guilt. 1°4 Disclosing information thus requires a belief that the information will
not be exposed to others. Indeed, both the Model Code and Model Rules
presume that there is nothing more fundamental to establishing trust and
confidence than a client's belief that his disclosures to his attorney will be
confidential. 10 5 In fact, the nonconsensual exposure of confidential information
by a lawyer may even have implications beyond the legal system; individuals may
refrain from seeking consultation with any skilled professional if they feel that
10 6
they cannot trust even a person whose job is to advocate on their behalf.
Exceptions in the ethical rules and standards to the general duty to maintain
confidentiality generally fall under one of four categories: disclosure of

100. FREEDMAN, supra note 98, at 4.

101. Id.
102. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 23, § 9.2, at 9-8 (suggesting that lawyers may prevent
violations of law by being fully informed when counseling clients).
103. This benefit is an especially persuasive ground to encourage full disclosure in the context of
child clients, who often are particularly in need of good legal counseling and advice about their
options. A teenaged client, for example, who wishes to run away from a foster home to return to her
parents, would be very reluctant to disclose those plans to anyone. If the client knows that disclosing
the plans to her lawyer will not mean that they will be exposed, she is more likely to share them. Upon
hearing the plans, the lawyer has the opportunity, and duty, to explain the various ramifications of the
client's plans, and to attempt to dissuade her.
104. See Landesman, supra note 98, at 197 (discussing categories of confidential information).
105. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6 cmts. 3-4; MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 4-1;
FREEDMAN, supra note 98, at 27.
106. FREEDMAN, supra note 98, at 5.
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confidential information to prevent a substantial future harm; 10 7 if necessary in
the course of litigation between a lawyer and her client;10 8 with the consent of a
client; 10 9 and if otherwise mandated or "impliedly authorized."' 10
The first two categories are "explicit exceptions to confidentiality."11 ' Each
of these categories is relevant only if two preconditions are met: a lawyer
disclosing the information must "reasonably believe" that the situation calls for
disclosure; and she must disclose information only "to the extent ... necessary"
to satisfy the exception. 12 Both exceptions recognize the fact that, at times, a
lawyer has obligations which override her duty to maintain confidentiality. The
future harm exception acknowledges that lawyers have moral obligations to
society that, on occasion, will trump their obligations to their clients." 3 The
107. See MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6(b)(1) ("A lawyer may reveal information relating
to the representation of a client
to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.");
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 4-101(C)(3) ("A lawyer may reveal ... [t~he intention of his client to
commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."). Note that while the Model
Code allows a confidentiality breach only if the harm is a crime which the client intends to commit, the
Model Rules allow a lawyer to reveal information if the harm is one perpetrated either by or on the
client.
108. See MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6(b)(3) ("A lawyer may reveal such information...
to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client...."); MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(4) ("A lawyer may reveal... [c]onfidences or secrets
necessary... to defend himself.., against an accusation of wrongful conduct."). Model Rule
1.6(b)(2), a new provision, also allows disclosure if a lawyer is attempting to "secure legal advice about
the lawyer's compliance with these Rules."
109. See MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information...
unless the client gives informed consent.
); MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 4-101(C)(1) ("A
lawyer may reveal ... [c]onfidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected .... ").
110. See MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information...
unless.., the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation .... );
MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6(b)(4) (A lawyer may reveal information.., to comply with other
law or court order"); MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 4-101(C)(2) ("A lawyer may reveal...
[c]onfidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.").
111. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 23, § 9.2, at 9-6 (discussing exceptions to requirement of
confidentiality).
112. See id., § 9.19, at 9-71 (explaining these two conditions of Model Rule 1.6(b)).
113. Until recently, Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), like Model Code DR 4-101(C)(3) allowed only
disclosure of information related to intentions of clients to commit criminal acts likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm. However, the 2002 edition of the Model Rules expanded
the exception to include "reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm," MODEL RULES, supra
note 13, R. 1.6(b)(1), whether or not the harm would result from a criminal act, and whether or not the
perpetrator of the act would be the client. In the context of child maltreatment, this expansion is
especially significant, since the information which a lawyer may feel the strongest compunction to
share does not involve the child client's actions; rather, it involves potential future actions by the child
client's parents or other perpetrators of neglect or abuse. Emily Buss, "You're My What?": The
Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their Lawyers' Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1725 n.79
(1996). A lawyer for a child client can now presumably disclose confidential information if she
"reasonably" believes disclosure necessary to prevent any actions of parents, guardians, or others,
which she is "reasonably" certain will lead to death or substantial bodily harm. The question of what
is "reasonable" in both clauses is sure to be answered very differently by different attorneys, as is the
question of whether "psychological" harm should also be considered grounds for disclosure. HAZARD
& HODES, supranote 23, § 9.20, at 9-75.

2002]

CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE CHILD CLIENT

"self-defense" exception acknowledges that lawyers must have the ability fully to
defend themselves from an action brought against them by a client, and to bring
a claim against a client. 1 4 These abilities would be unfairly compromised in
many cases if the lawyer could not reveal confidential information necessary for
115
her claim or defense.
The third category recognizes that the client always retains control of the
information, and therefore the power to consent to disclosure. 116 Clients
regularly consent to their lawyers' disclosure of information, implicitly and
explicitly, in order to enable their lawyers to carry out the representation in as
effective a manner as possible.11 7 A truly informed consent entails a full
explanation by the lawyer of the "pros and cons of permitting the disclosure, in
language appropriate to the client's level of sophistication."'1 8 Allowing the
client to provide informed consent for disclosure conforms to the understanding
that, generally, the determination of when information should remain
confidential remains with the client.
The final category, which allows for disclosure if "otherwise authorized,"
involve both "forced" exceptions, and disclosures impliedly authorized to carry
out the representation of a client. 119 Forced exceptions occur where laws outside
the professional codes override the confidentiality provisions. Such outside laws
include judicial orders, statutes, or and other ethical provisions. These
exceptions permit, for example, a lawyer to override the confidentiality
obligation where she must avoid becoming an accessory or instrument of a
client's current or future misdeed.12 0 "Impliedly authorized" exceptions permit
disclosure where such disclosure advances or safeguards the interests of the
client, such as "admitting a fact that cannot properly be disputed, or in
121
negotiation ... making a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion."
Part II.B discusses in part how the "implied authorization" of any disclosure
necessary to provide competent representation permits lawyers for child clients
122
to consult with mental health professionals under certain circumstances.
114. See HAZARD & HODES, supranote 23, § 9.22, at 9-84 (explaining that this exception applies
predominantly to fee disputes or allegations of legal malpractice).
115. Id., § 9.22, at 9-85 (concluding that "simple fairness demands that the lawyer be permitted to
present her claim or defense without handicap").
116. Id., § 9.17, at 9-58.
117. Id.
118. Id., § 9.16, at 9-57 to 9-58.
119. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 23, § 9.24, at 9-91.
120. Id., § 9.24, at 9-92.
121. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.6 cmt. 7. This implied authorization includes what is
reasonably necessary for the lawyer taking action, including consulting with individuals or entities that
have the ability to take action, to protect the interests of a client with diminished capacity. Id. R.
1.14(b)-(c).
122. The other exceptions hold less promise. The future harm exception applies to situations
where a lawyer's moral obligations to society to prevent harms override her obligation to protect
confidential information. This exception is inapplicable, however, to any situation where the
consultation is not for the explicit purpose of avoiding the death or substantial physical injury to a
person, or preventing the client's commission of a crime. The self-defense exception to the

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

B. How the Confidentiality Duty Applies in the Representation of Diminished
Capacity Clients
The ethical provisions on representing diminished capacity clients presume
that, while the diminished capacity 123 of a client may affect the responsibilities
and duties of that client's lawyer generally, the lawyer must continue to maintain
a normal client-lawyer relationship as far as is reasonably possible. 124 A normal
client-lawyer relationship includes treating the client with attention and
respect, 125 according the represented person the status of client as far as is
possible, 126 and safeguarding and advancing the client's interests. 127 None of
these mandates does anything explicitly to minimize the confidentiality duty; in
fact, they strongly imply that whenever possible the duty should be maintained.
As discussed above, 128 confidentiality is a pillar of the lawyer-client relationship,
and certainly a crucial part of the represented party's "status as client." In a
"normal" lawyer-client relationship, no disclosure of confidential information is
12 9
permitted unless the client provides consent, or some other exception is met.
The presumption with diminished capacity clients is therefore that
confidentiality should be maintained unless there is some rationale that this is
not reasonably possible.
While the ethical provisions on representing diminished capacity clients
create a presumption that the confidentiality duty should be observed, they also
suggest the conditions under which confidentiality could be breached. A
rationale for why confidentiality could not reasonably be maintained, for
example, certainly could exist in the context of consultations with mental health
professionals by lawyers for diminished capacity clients. In that context, lawyers
130
often cannot reasonably meet their duty to provide competent representation

confidentiality rule applies only to situations where a lawyer must disclose confidential information to
defend herself or to establish a claim in the course of any formal legal dispute with a client; such
situations have no bearing on the question of consultation for the purposes of the representation of the
client. Finally, the consent exception also does not apply. Lawyers for diminished capacity child
clients cannot avail themselves of informed consent as a method of circumventing the ethical quandary
because, by definition, their clients are not yet capable of providing a knowledgeable, intelligent and
voluntary waiver of confidentiality.
123. Ethical provisions recognize that diminished capacity may be caused, among other things, by
age and experience. See MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.14(a) ("minority, mental impairment or
for some other reason"); MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-11 ("intelligence, experience, mental
condition or age").
124. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.14.
125. Id., R. 1.14 cmt. 2.
126. Id.
127. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-12 (dictating that in absence of other legal guardian
or representative, lawyer compelled to make decision for incompetent child).
128. Supra note 113 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the consent and other
exceptions to the confidentiality requirement.
130. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 13, R. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation
to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."); MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 6-

20021

CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE CHILD CLIENT

without such consultation. 131
Ethical rules, 132 statutes, 133 and practice
134
guidelines
all create responsibilities and duties for lawyers for diminished
capacity child clients that often cannot be met without consultation with a
mental health professional. In these cases, it is not always reasonably possible
for these lawyers to maintain the confidentiality duty inherent in a "normal"
lawyer-client relationship while at the same time providing competent
representation. The disclosure of confidential information is ethical under such
circumstances, then, because without it, it is not possible for a lawyer
competently to fulfill her representational duties and responsibilities.
The duty of lawyers for diminished capacity clients to safeguard and
advance their clients' interests 135 illuminates further the proper circumstances for
breaching the confidentiality duty. As discussed above, clients have an
important interest in maintaining confidentiality. 36 Without confidentiality, a
client may feel less free to disclose information fully to his lawyer because he
knows there is a risk that the lawyer will disclose information to others; yet in the
absence of that full disclosure, a lawyer cannot provide thorough counsel and
advocacy. A client's interest in competent representation is thus inextricably
linked with his interest in confidentiality. In order to receive fully informed
representation, he must believe any information disclosed to his lawyer will
remain confidential.
How should the link between confidentiality and competent representation
be taken into account by lawyers for diminished capacity clients? It might seem
as though no interest in confidentiality exists for a diminished capacity child
client. Diminished capacity, after all, affects the client's ability to perform two
functions which are vital to the justification for the confidentiality duty:
imparting complete and accurate information, 137 and understanding the promise
of confidentiality. 138 The inability to comprehend the promise of confidentiality

101(A)(1) ("A lawyer shall not... [hiandle a matter which he knows or should know that he is not
competent to handle .... ").
131. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 6-3 ("Proper preparation and representation may
require the association by the lawyer of professionals in other disciplines.").
132. See supra Part L.A for a discussion of ethical mandates of children's lawyers that require
consultation with mental health professionals.
133. See supra Part .B for a discussion of statutory requirements of children's lawyers that
require consultation with mental health professionals.
134. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of practice guidelines for children's lawyers that require
consultation with mental health professionals.
135. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-12.

136. See supra notes 103-13 for a discussion of the rationale for the duty of confidentiality.
137. See CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY, supra note 67, at 53-199 (describing developmental issues
relevant to children's ability to recall and relate events); Nancy W. Perry & Larry L. Teply,
Interviewing, Counseling, and In-Court Examination of Children: PracticalApproaches for Attorneys,

18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1369, 1386-98 (1985) (discussing problems children have with accurately
recalling information); see also Walker & Nguyen, supra note 48, at 1587-88 (asserting that quality of
information received from children depends in large part on methods and techniques used by
interviewer).
138. See JANET WILDE ASTINGTON, THE CHILD'S DISCOVERY OF THE MIND 180 (1993)
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renders that promise useless as a tool for procuring trust, and the client's
inability to impart full and accurate information makes procuring the trust less
139
relevant to the lawyer's duty to gather all relevant factual information.
Viewed from this perspective, a lawyer seemingly could disclose confidential
information without compromising the trust of her client, since the client could
not understand the promise of confidentiality, and without compromising
information-gathering, because the client could not impart accurate information.
detriment to the quality of
There would therefore be no consequent
140
representation if such disclosures were made.
While there is no doubt that diminished capacity affects the interest in
confidentiality preservation at least somewhat, it does so to a far lesser degree
than it originally may seem, because of a consideration truly unique to the
representation of child clients: the capacity of a child to communicate and
comprehend is a constantly developing one. Almost all diminished capacity child
clients will gradually develop the ability to impart accurate information
verbally 141 and to understand the concept of confidentiality, 142 and many of them
will develop this capacity over the course of their involvement with the child
welfare system and their lawyer. A switch is not thrown which suddenly
provides a previously non-comprehending child with the ability to provide
complete, accurate information,1 43 or the insight to understand fully all the
nuances of confidentiality and ramifications of disclosure. Rather, that capacity
develops, and as it develops, the client will take confidentiality increasingly
seriously and will be increasingly reluctant to share information with his lawyer if
Any
he sees that she discloses information about him indiscriminately.
therefore
must
information
confidential
responsible manner of disclosing
account for the fact that while a child client may have a diminished capacity to
understand confidentiality, he also has a developing capacity, and therefore a
developing interest in confidentiality.
Most child clients will develop at least some ability to provide accurate
information and understand confidentiality long before the end of the lawyerclient relationship. 144 One of the unfortunate realities of the child welfare
(describing how comprehension of concepts such as secrets is expected to develop by age five).

139. In spite of any difference in how much information can be gleaned from young clients,
however, lawyers for child clients still have as important a mandate as client-directed lawyers to have
"full and accurate knowledge" about their cases. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, § C-2 (detailing duty
to investigate); REPRESENTING CHILDREN, supra note 3, § 4-3, at 89-94 (describing methods of
gathering full information about client).
140. If the confidentiality duty does not apply to lawyers for diminished capacity clients, then
these lawyers face no ethical quandary. They may freely consult with mental health practitioners
without violating any duty not to disclose confidential information.
141. See Robyn Fivush, The Development of Autobiographical Memory, in CHILDREN'S
TESTIMONY, supra note 67, 55, 56-62 (describing development of verbal recall).
142. See ASINGTON, supra note 138, at 180 (describing how comprehension of concepts such as
secrets is expected to develop by age five).
143. Adults, of course, are not always the most accurate reporters of information either.
144. See REPRESENTING CHILDREN, supra note 3, § 3-2(b)(2), at 53-54, for an enlightening
description of how this development of capacities should affect advocacy.

2002]

CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE CHILD CLIENT

system is that children spend years involved with their cases, and therefore years
involved with their lawyers. (See Table 1.) One recent nationwide survey
estimated that the average length of time a child in foster care spends in the
system is thirty-two months. 145 When combined with the fact that a child is
usually represented for at least one year upon release from foster care, 146 the
147
total time of representation averages nearly four years.
Table 1: Lengths of Stay for Children in Foster Care in 1999
MONTHS IN FOSTER CARE

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
NUMBER OF CHILDREN

< 1 Month
1 to 5 Mos

4%
24,329
16%
94,044

6 to 11 Mos
12 to 17 Mos

15%
85,036
11%
65,014

18 to 23 Mos
24 to 29 Mos
30 to 35 Mos
3 to 4 Yrs
5 Yrs or More

9%
51,985
8%
43,918
6%
33,269
15%
85,128
17%
98,276
32

Mean Months Spent in Foster
Care
Median Months Spent in Foster
20
Care
Source: The AFCARS Report, http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/
cb/publications/afcars/june200l.htm

145. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., The AFCARS Report (June 2001), available
at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/june200l.htm.
146. Most states require representation through the expiration of the last order of the court,
usually extending representation for twelve months beyond the date of discharge to the parents. See,
e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1016 (McKinney 1999) (providing that appointment of law guardian
continue until expiration of appointment order).
147. This number is only an average. Many children remain in foster care much longer, and it is
impossible to know at the inception of a case which children will remain in care for a brief time and
which for a lengthy time. While the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 1997
U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 2115, has made attempts to reduce the amount of time children spend in
foster care, it is still too early to know how effective the Act has been.
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Table 2: Ages of Children in Foster Care in 1999
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
NUMBER OF CHILDREN
4%
Under 1 Yr
23,396
25%
1 thru 5 Yrs
143,268
26%
6 thru 10 Yrs
1.50,574
28%
11 thru 15 Yrs
164,134
16%
16 thru 18 Yrs
90,293
2%
19 + Yrs
9,335
Source: The AFCARS Report, http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/
cb/publications/afcars/june200l.htm
AGE

At the same time, by five years of age, most children both understand the
concept of keeping a secret, 148 and can recall past events with sufficient
reliability to provide credible factual information. 49 Even children who are
newborns when first assigned a lawyer, 150 therefore, may very well possess
sufficient capacity both to understand the concept of confidentiality and to
impart accurate information to his lawyer at some point during the course of the
t 51
representation.
Further, the argument that because the information from diminished
capacity child clients is less reliable, it is not so important to encourage
communication through the confidentiality promise belies the significance of that
information. Even very young clients are capable of imparting information
which, while perhaps different in nature than typical information gleaned from a
client, can be equally important to competent advocacy and counseling. They
can evince personalities, attachments to caretakers, and developmental
milestones which are important pieces of information in advocating effectively
for them as clients. 152 While the information obtained from many child clients
may at times be less complete and less accurate than that obtained from older
clients, it is nevertheless crucial to certain duties of the lawyer, such as

148. ASINGTON, supra note 138, at 180; see GARY SOLOMON, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN
CHILD PROTECrIVE PROCEEDINGS 87 (1999) (instructing to avoid use of "secret" in explaining
confidentiality because it may have acquired other connotations).
149. Perry & Teply, supra note 137, at 1389.
150. See Table 2, supra, for a breakdown of the ages of children in foster care.
151. Some children may be severely mental retarded or have other similar problems which
impair permanently their ability to develop this capacity.
152. REPRESENTING CHILDREN, supra note 3, § 3-2(b)(2), at 53.
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153
determining her client's best interests.
For those child clients who have developed, or are in the process of
developing, the capacity to understand confidentiality and to impart accurate
information, the interest in confidentiality is especially strong. The promise to
keep a secret sends a powerful and clear message to a child, and resonates
especially deeply with child clients in abuse and neglect cases, making it of
critical importance in the formulation and maintenance of an effective lawyerclient relationship. 154 Children involved in maltreatment cases, betrayed by
adults in myriad ways, have myriad reasons for distrusting them. 155 Parents who
were supposed to love and protect them instead have abused or neglected them.
Caseworkers have divulged their family secrets to judges, attorneys, and even
their parents. Foster parents who were supposed to act as surrogate caretakers
have reported their misbehaviors and confidences to social workers, therapists,
and others. Through a promise not to tell these or other adults what a child tells
her, a lawyer signals in a particularly powerful way that she is different from
those adults, and, more importantly, that she has a relationship with the client
that is deeply different from any relationship the lawyer may have with those
other adults. When a lawyer promises to keep a child client's confidences, and
then honors that promise, she takes the first and perhaps most critical step in
establishing the sort of trusting lawyer-client relationship which is the hallmark
of effective advocacy and counseling. 156 Without that promise, the client himself
must try to make sense of what information is safe to share with the lawyer, and
the lawyer consequently becomes just one more part of a system against which
the client struggles. 157 The armor of confidentiality creates the safe haven for
these children which makes effective advocacy and counseling for them possible.
Lawyers, therefore, must carefully consider the developing ability of diminished
capacity child clients to understand confidentiality, and the consequent

153. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, § B-5 cmt. ("Even nonverbal children can communicate their
needs and interests through their behaviors and developmental levels."). Professor Peters illuminates
how significant the information from a young client can be for sound decision-making in assessing the
best interests of a client. She writes:
In making a best interests determination, it is the lawyer's responsibility to carry out a full,
efficient, and speedy factual investigation with the goal of achieving a detailed understanding
of the child client's unique personality, her family system, history, and daily life. This
process should include the client's own words, stories, and desires at every possible point.

Even where the lawyer has determined that the child cannot fully understand or express
desires about the legal issues of the case, there will be very few verbal children who cannot
express some views about their own lives.
Roles and Content, supra note 6, at 1566 (emphasis added).
154. Randi Mandelbaum, Rules of Confidentiality When Representing Children: The Need for a
"Bright Line" Test, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2053,2057-58 (1996).

155. See id. (pointing out that many children are involved in court processes precisely because
they shared secrets with those whom they thought they could trust).
156. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the centrality of the duty
of confidentiality in the attorney-client relationship.
157. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among
Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 349, 352 (1981).
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developing interest in confidentiality, as a significant factor in determining
whether and how to disclose information.
Any disclosure of confidential information by a lawyer for a diminished
capacity client to a mental health professional must therefore meet two
conditions in order to be ethical. The disclosure must be necessary to meet an
explicit representational responsibility of the lawyer, and the disclosure must be
made in a manner which respects the client's developing interest in
confidentiality. Part III illustrates how the current standard for disclosure by
lawyers for diminished capacity child clients fails to meet either of those criteria,
and Part IV proposes a new standard to ensure those criteria are met by lawyers
in their daily practice.
III. THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD FOR DISCLOSURE
Lawyers who represent diminished capacity children must, in a variety of
contexts, make decisions on behalf of their clients. 158 These decisions are usually
made based on the lawyer's assessment of what would be in her clients' best
interests. 159 One possible standard for disclosure of confidential information,
then, would be to permit such disclosure whenever, in the lawyer's opinion, it
would be in the best interests of the child client. 160 In the context of the
consultation, the best interests standard would allow each individual lawyer to
determine when to share confidential information with mental health consultants
based on her personal assessment of whether it would be best for the client.
While attractive both because it would be consistent with the criterion used for
most decisions made by lawyers for diminished capacity clients, and because it
would be consistent with the current practice of many lawyers, the best interests
standard unfortunately fails to meet the two conditions discussed in Part II for
the ethical disclosure of confidential information to mental health professionals
by lawyers for diminished capacity child clients. It neither limits permissible
disclosures to those which are necessary for the lawyer to meet an explicit
representational responsibility, nor evinces any consideration for a child client's
developing interest in maintaining the confidentiality of information relating to
the representation. By merely requiring lawyers to follow their own values and
beliefs in making disclosure decisions, the standard barely establishes even
illusory conditions for disclosure, let alone a strict requirement that disclosure be
permitted only if necessary to meet a representational responsibility. 161 Further,
158. See e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-12 (dictating that in absence of other legal
guardian or representative, lawyer compelled to make decision for incompetent child).
159. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, § B-5 (setting forth lawyer's duty to determine child client's
legal interests).
160. See Ass'n of the B. of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof'& Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 1997-2,
in REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE B. OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 430, 436-38 (1997) (opining that where child
client unable to make reasoned decision about whether to disclose abuse, lawyer may disclose if she
concludes it would be in client's best interests); see also Report of the Working Group on
Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1373 (1996) (proposing model statute for guardians ad
litem which would allow disclosure when it is in best interest of child).
161. Even proponents of the best interests standard for guardians ad litem, rather than lawyers,
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the unlimited discretion the standard gives to lawyers as to the nature and
amount of information disclosed disregards the continuously developing interest
in confidentiality of diminished capacity child clients. Both of these failures
ultimately compromise the lawyer's ability to establish a trusting lawyer-client
relationship, and consequently limit her ability to meet her responsibilities to
advocate for, and counsel, her client competently.
A. The Best Interests Standard'sFailure to Condition Disclosureon the Necessity
of Meeting RepresentationalResponsibilities
The best interests standard allows a lawyer to disclose confidential
information if, in the lawyer's opinion, to do so would be best for the client. The
standard offers no criteria for deciding if disclosure is, in fact, best for the client.
By default, that determination relies on each individual lawyer's values and
beliefs. 62 In order to justify disclosure, the lawyer must merely conform her
decision with her personal opinion of what is best for the client. The standard
thus not only ignores the ethical requirement that disclosure be necessary to

meet a representational responsibility, it provides no meaningful guideline at all
on determining when to disclose confidential information. 163 The following
example illustrates how variable the disclosure decision can be when made using
the best interests standard.
Lisa M. Revisited 164
Lisa M. is a four-year-old child whose father allegedly sexually abused her.
The father vehemently denies the accusation, and claims that Lisa's mother, from
whom he is divorced, has coerced Lisa into fabricatingthe allegations. In order to
make Lisa more comfortable speaking with her, the lawyer has spent a lot of time
with Lisa developing rapport. The lawyer hopes Lisa will feel comfortable enough
either to provide additional corroborativedetails about the abuse, or perhaps to

recognize this as a limitation. See Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem as Surrogate Parents:
Implications for Role Definition and Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1801 (1996)
("[Guardians ad litem] might make different judgments about disclosure than their wards' parents
would make. Some decisions might serve children's interests better than their parents' decisions,
others might not.").
162. This problem exists for "best interests" representation in general. A growing number of
scholars and practitioners argue that any determination of a client's best interests should be based on
the lawyer's duty to enforce and advance the legal interests of her client. E.g., Martin Guggenheim, A
Paradigmfor Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1420 (1996).
Such a standard grounds the lawyer's decisions not in how best to comport with the lawyer's own
values and beliefs on what is best for her client; it grounds the decisions in how best to enforce and
advance statutory or court-mandated rights. The pitfalls inherent in value-laden best interests
determinations-the "chaos and randomness which a rational legal system would seek to avoid," id. at
1431-would be drastically reduced.
163. One could also argue that even where a lawyer making decisions based on her assessment of
her client's best interests does not actually disclose confidential information directly to others, the very
nature of best interests representation violates the confidentiality duty. See Buss, supra note 113, at
1744-45 (contending that lawyer's mere explanation to court of her "best interests" position on behalf
of her client necessarily entails client's loss of control over private information).
164. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the "Lisa M." example.
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admit that she was not actually abused. To reach that comfort level, the lawyer
consistently reassures Lisa that the lawyer is not allowed to tell other people what
they talk about. At their most recent meeting, Lisa says she has something she
wants to tell the lawyer about her mother, but that she wants to know first whether
the lawyer always has to follow the rule about not telling other people. The lawyer
then explains the best interests exception by saying that she will only tell other
people what Lisa says if she thinks "that is what is best for Lisa." Lisa proceeds to
disclose that, two weeks earlier,Lisa told her mother that it was her mother's fault
that Lisa was abused because she let Lisa go visit her father. Lisa says that her
mother was so mad when Lisa said this that she slapped Lisa hard in the face.
When the lawyer asks if this often happens, Lisa says it happens whenever her
mother is really angry. After this disclosure,the lawyer tries to convince Lisa that
the family therapist who is seeing Lisa and her mother should be told about the
incident. In spite of much counseling by the lawyer, Lisa continues adamantly to
insist that the lawyer not tell anyone else.
Pursuant to the best interests standard for disclosure, the lawyer must now
consider whether it is in Lisa's best interests for the lawyer to inform the
therapist of Lisa's disclosure of corporal punishment. On the one hand, the
lawyer believes that the therapist, who has just begun seeing Lisa and her
mother, should have complete information in order to provide effective
counseling. On the other hand, the lawyer has concerns both that the therapist
may be required to call in a report to child protective services based on the
slapping incidents, 165 thereby putting Lisa at risk of being removed from her
mother's care and placed in foster care, and that the lawyer's relationship with
Lisa may be damaged if she discloses the information against Lisa's will. 166 The
lawyer personally believes that effective therapy is of paramount importance for
Lisa at this point, and in general highly values the restorative power of informed
family counseling; she also is strongly opposed to all forms of corporal
punishment and is deeply disturbed that a child in Lisa's delicate emotional state
is being slapped in the face by the person who is supposed to be providing her
with comfort and reassurance. Given her personal values, the lawyer decides
disclosure would be in Lisa's best interests, and tells the therapist about the
corporal punishment.
Lisa's lawyer considered several issues in making her disclosure decision,
including the risk of a temporary removal, whether that removal is appropriate,
and the importance of informed counseling. The amount of weight the lawyer
gave to each of these factors ultimately determined what decision the lawyer
made about disclosure. Different lawyers, guided only by their own values and
experiences, could easily come to completely opposite conclusions on what is in
Lisa's best interests. While Lisa's lawyer may feel that the disclosure is crucial to
effective family counseling in such a difficult time, another lawyer may believe

165. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duty to report abuse.
166. See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on Allocation of Decision Making, 64 FORDHAM L.

REV. 1325, 1336 (1996) (describing how one child client was not able to trust her lawyer again after
lawyer disclosed a confidence six years earlier).
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that the risk of Lisa's being removed from her mother, even if a small risk, is of
far greater concern. A third lawyer may decide not to disclose because of the
importance she places on Lisa's wishes. A disclosure determination which could
have profound and long-lasting effects on Lisa's continued placement with her
mother, on the effectiveness of the family therapy, and on the trust between Lisa
and her lawyer, therefore depends essentially on the lawyer's own values and
experiences. 167 The purely subjective nature of the best interests standard make
it only an illusory guideline, and lead to a randomness which is anathema to a
rational legal system. 168
B. The Best Interest Standard'sFailureto Consider the Child Client's Developing
Interest in Confidentiality
The best interests standard also fails to take into consideration the
developing interest of child clients in confidentiality. This failure manifests itself
most starkly in the standard's lack of either any limits on the amount of
information which lawyers may disclose, or any precautions which lawyers must
take to prevent further exposure of that information. The absence of such limits
or precautions exhibits an utter disregard for the fact that disclosures made by
the lawyer easily can come to the attention of clients who are developing some
capacity to understand the confidentiality duty. When a client sees that his
lawyer has been indiscriminate as to the amount of information disclosed, and as
to the risk of further exposure, it places in serious jeopardy the lawyer's ability to
cultivate in her client the trust necessary for an effective lawyer-client
relationship. By minimizing the exposure of confidential information when some
disclosure is necessary to meet a representational responsibility, the lawyer sends
an important signal that she values the client's developing understanding of, and
interest in, confidentiality.
The following example illustrates the unnecessary permissiveness of the
best interests standard.
169
Jason S. Revisited
Jason is four-and-one-half-years-old. His parents admitted to engaging in
acts of domestic violence in Jason's presence, and to cocaine use. The local
department of social services has referred the parents to a domestic violence
program and a drug rehabilitationprogram, each of which provides weekly group
counseling. Jason's lawyer has decided that it would be best for Jason if she
contacted the counselorprovidingthe group counseling to the parents to determine
whether these programs are sufficient and appropriatefor the ultimate goal of

167. See Roles and Content, supra note 6, at 1554 (arguing that while discretion often given to
lawyers for children can be minimized and exercised in principled manner, it cannot be eliminated).
Professor Peters also notes that some discretion is inherent in the representation of all clients, whether
or not they are children. Id.
168. See Guggenheim, supra note 162, at 1440, 1431 (stating that allowing child's lawyer to
advocate for outcome she believes is in child's best interest leads to inconsistency that should be
avoided whenever possible).
169. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the "Jason S." example.
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reunifying the family. The counselor requests some additional background on the
case, and the lawyer subsequently provides the counselor with her file, which
includes notes from the lawyer's interviews with Jason, copies of the petition, case
records, and various other documents. The lawyer does not remove the interview
notes when she provides the file to the counselor.
In this case, the needs of the lawyer do not require her to disclose the
amount of confidential information which she provided to the counselor. The
interview notes, for example, likely contain little or no information of relevance
to an assessment of the appropriateness of the counseling services provided to
the parents. The information about the length and severity of the domestic
violence and drug abuse, which are the crucial factors in the assessment, is
readily obtainable from the petition and other court documents. Under the best
interests standard, however, the lawyer is under no obligation to remove or
redact the interview notes.
In addition, the information is being given to an individual who has no
obligation to preserve Jason's confidences, and whose therapeutic obligation is in
fact to Jason's parents, creating an even greater risk of disclosure. The
counselor, for example, may very well see a therapeutic benefit for the parents if
she brings up information from the interview notes concerning Jason's reaction
to seeing his parents fight.1 70 That conversation with his lawyer, however, may
be one Jason is especially concerned remain confidential. The risks of exposure
of the confidential information could very easily have been avoided if the lawyer
had consulted with a psychologist not involved with the family. Mental health
professionals can be involved with families in a variety of ways, including as a
retained mental health professional, as a mental health professional providing
treatment to the child or family, and as a mental health professional appointed
by the court to evaluate the child or family. 171 Each role poses a different level
of risk of exposure. 172 The best interests standard, however, imposes no
obligation on the lawyer to minimize the risk of exposure of confidential
information by consulting with a professional whose role minimizes that risk.
C. The Best Interests Standard'sEffect on Competent Advocacy and Counseling
The best interests standard's deferral to each individual lawyer's personal
assessment of a client's best interests, and its failure to consider in any manner
the developing interest of child clients in confidentiality, pose serious risks to the
lawyer's ability to provide competent advocacy and counseling to her client. The
173
If
promise of confidentiality stands as a pillar of the lawyer-client relationship.
the promise of confidentiality does not apply whenever the lawyer thinks it
170. See supra note 17 for more detail on the confidentiality obligations of mental health
professionals.
171. See REPRESENTING CHILDREN, supra note 3, § 5-4(a), at 133-40 (discussing various types of
mental health experts who might be involved with a child in maltreatment case).
172. See infra notes 199-206 for a discussion of these levels of risk.
173. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the centrality of the duty
of confidentiality in the attorney-client relationship.
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should not, and if the lawyer, in fact, may completely disregard confidentiality in
the manner in which she discloses information, the power of that promise and
the trust it inspires are drastically weakened. Without that trust, a lawyer will be
severely handicapped in any attempt to provide her client with informed
counseling, or to advocate with a full understanding of her client's position and
interests.
The dependence on the values of individual lawyers to make
disclosure decisions on behalf of their clients, rather than dependence on the
existence of an explicit representational responsibility, thus affects the lawyerclient relationship in an especially disruptive manner when the determinations
relate to the disclosure of confidential information.1 74 The following example
illustrates how, by relying on subjective considerations and by granting complete
discretion on how much and to whom disclosures may be made, the best interests
standard risks undermining the trust between a child client and his lawyer which
is necessary for effective advocacy and counseling.
75
Roger M. Revisited
Roger M. is a four-year-old boy who has been removed from his parents due
to allegations of excessive corporalpunishment. Roger has been placed in the care
of his maternal grandparents, who supervise his contact with his parents. At
several of the visits, Roger has continued to be beaten by his parents. Roger
discloses this information to his lawyer. Roger, who has been seeing a child
psychologist to address issues of hyperactivity, does not want the lawyer to disclose
the information to anyone, including the psychologist. The lawyer, however, feels
that the psychologist's treatment of Roger may be much more effective if he knows
about the continued beatings. The lawyer decides to tell the psychologist, who then
confronts the grandparents. The grandparentsadmit that they have allowed the
beatings to occur. The psychologist, as a mandated reporter, calls in a report to
child protective services. Roger is subsequently removed from the care of his
grandparents,placed in non-kinship foster care, and has his contact with his
parents limited to agency-supervised visitation. Over the course of the next four
years, Roger's parents only sporadically cooperate with the child protective
agency's referrals for services. Eventually, the agency files a petition to terminate
the parental rights of Roger's parents so that he can be adopted by his foster
parents. Roger is conflicted and unsure about whether he wants to be adopted. He
is in real need of advice on his options and their ramifications. In addition, now
eight-years-old, he has a much greater capacity to share information and seek
counsel from his lawyer. He also has a better understanding of the concept of
confidentiality. Roger, however, knows that his request to his lawyer that she not
disclose the continued beatings by his parents was ignored. He does not trust that
his communications with his lawyer will remain confidential,and is reluctant to
176
seek her advice.

174. Although this disruption is more pronounced in disclosure decisions, best interests decisionmaking on behalf of a client in general suffers from the flaw of subjectivity.
175. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the "Roger M." example.
176. See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on Allocation of Decision Making,supra note 166, at
1336 (describing how one child client was not able to trust her lawyer again after lawyer disclosed a
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Because of his reluctance to communicate openly with his lawyer, Roger is
being denied effective representation. The lawyer neither knows what position
to advocate on behalf of Roger at the termination proceeding, 177 nor is aware of
Roger's need for legal counseling on the ramifications of each of the possible
outcomes in court. 178 For many children in the child welfare system, most adults
involved in their life are individuals against whom they have struggled in one
way or another: a parent who neglects or abuses; a caseworker who removes
them from the home; a judge who makes seemingly unfair decisions. 79 When a
client sees that his interest in confidentiality is, or has been, important to his
lawyer, he is much more likely to see the lawyer as an ally rather than a part of
an overwhelming and insensitive "system."' 180 Consequently, he is more likely to
share information necessary for effective advocacy and counseling.
IV. A PROPOSED

STANDARD FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION TO CONSULTING MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS

Standard for the Disclosure of Information to Consulting Mental Health
Professionals by Lawyers for Child Clients With a Diminished Capacity to
Provide Informed Consent:
Any lawyer who represents a child client with a diminished capacity to
provide informed consent for the disclosure of confidential information
must observe the duty to preserve the confidentiality of all information
relating to the representation, unless the disclosure of that information
is for the purpose of meeting an explicit representational responsibility.
The lawyer may disclose only the minimal amount of information
necessary to meet that responsibility, and must limit to the greatest
extent possible the potential exposure of the disclosed information to
individuals not covered by the attorney-client privilege. The lawyer
must make a written record of any decision to disclose confidential
information, and the grounds for that disclosure, so that the client may
review the disclosure decision when the client develops the capacity to
do so.
The proposed standard specifically prohibits lawyers from disclosing
confidential information to mental health professionals unless the lawyer is
confidence six years earlier);see also Janet A. Chaplan, Youth Perspectives on Lawyers' Ethics: A
Report on Seven Interviews, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1763, 1778-81 (reporting seven foster children's
feelings that, generally, other than reporting abuse, "if you and your lawyer say something or talk
about something that you think is personal, then that should be between you two").
177. Roger is thus being denied advocacy of his position, in direct violation of ethical provisions.
See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 13, R. 3.1-3.9 (setting forth duty of advocacy); MODEL CODE, supra
note 5, CANON 7 (setting forth duty of zealous representation).
178. Roger is thus being denied legal counseling, again in violation of ethical provisions. See
MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 2.1 (setting forth duty of counseling); MODEL CODE, supra note 5,
EC 7-8 (explaining duty of counseling).
179. See Objection Your Honor, FOSTER CARE YOUTH UNITED, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 2-15
(presenting series of articles by youth in foster care expressing frustrations with caseworkers, judges,
and lawyers involved in their cases).
180. See id. at 9-12 (reporting positive experiences with lawyers).
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disclosing the information in order to meet an explicit representational
responsibility. The standard also contains provisions which should ensure that
disclosures are made in a manner which respects the fact that child clients are in
the process of developing an understanding of, and interest in, the confidentiality
of information relating to their case. These provisions require lawyers to tailor
the scope of information disclosed, and the number of persons to whom the
information is exposed, to the minimum amount necessary to meet the
representational responsibility. The provisions also impose a duty on lawyers to
record their disclosure decisions and the rationale behind them, so that when
child clients develop an understanding of, and interest in, confidentiality, they
will have access to explanations for decisions previously made on their behalf.
i. Any lawyer.., must observe the duty to preserve the confidentiality of all
information...
The ethical rules require that clients with a diminished capacity to make
decisions for themselves should be treated, as much as possible, like clients with
a normal capacity to do so. 181 The presumption is that the confidentiality duty, a
pillar of a "normal" lawyer-client relationship, should apply to diminished
capacity clients as well. The proposed standard therefore begins with an
assertion that the confidentiality duty must be observed.
ii.... unless the disclosure... is for the purpose of meeting an explicit
representationalresponsibility.
The ethical rules permit disclosure of confidential information without
client consent if the disclosure is necessary to carry out the representation of the
client. 182 Accordingly, lawyers for diminished capacity clients may disclose
confidential information to mental health professionals whenever that disclosure
is for the purpose of meeting an explicit representational responsibility. The
distinction between a disclosure to meet such a responsibility, and one which is
not, is best illustrated through examples.
In the case of Tara G., 183 Tara has said that she wishes to return to the home
of her parents, who allegedly have punched her and beat her with a belt buckle
to the extent of causing bruises on her face, torso, and legs. Tara's lawyer must
develop her position on Tara's return to her parents. As a lawyer for a "client
with diminished capacity,"' 184 she therefore has a representational responsibility
to determine Tara's level of impairment in order to know how much weight her
client's wishes should have in the decision-making process. Because Tara's
lawyer, like most lawyers will need to consult with a mental health professional

181. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the applicability of the duty of confidentiality in the
representation of diminished capacity clients.
182. See supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exceptions to the duty
of confidentiality.
183. See supra Part L.A for a discussion of the "Tara G." example.
184. MODEL RULES, supra note 13, R. 1.14.
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185
in order to meet her responsibility of determining Tara's level of impairment,
186
is
permissible.
purpose
that
for
the disclosure of confidential information
The case of Jason S. 187 provides another example of a disclosure for the
purpose of meeting an explicit representational responsibility. After allegations
of drug abuse and domestic violence were made against Jason's parents, he was
temporarily removed from their care and placed in a non-kinship foster home.
Jason has been seeing a psychologist to evaluate both his adjustment to the
foster home, which has been difficult, and the effects of his witnessing domestic
violence. Jason's paternal aunt, who previously had adopted Jason's brother,
Sam, has offered to take Jason until he can be returned to his parents.
The state where Jason resides, like many states, has a statute which requires
that when removing a child from his parents, child protective services must place
the child with relatives whenever such placement is not clearly contrary to the
child's best interests.1 88 A report from child protective services about the
paternal aunt's fitness describes the home as "chaotic," and Sam's attendance at
school as "poor." It further reveals that the aunt has, since her adoption of Sam,
married a man with a criminal record for selling drugs, and that, since he moved
into the aunt's home, the husband also has been arrested once for assault,
although the charges were eventually dropped. Child protective services argues
that the aunt's home is inappropriate for Jason.
Jason's lawyer has a representational responsibility to advance Jason's legal
interests, 189 as well as a responsibility to assess those interests through a full
investigation. 190 The psychologist who is treating Jason will very likely have
information crucial to a comparison of the effects on Jason of placement in a
foster home environment with the effects of placement with the paternal aunt.
Such information would include Jason's need for a calm and structured
environment and the importance to Jason's emotional and psychological wellbeing of placement with relatives. In order to obtain this information, and to
explain why she needs it, Jason's lawyer will almost certainly have to disclose to
the psychologist some background information-normally confidential-about
Jason, Jason's family, and the case. Because those disclosures must be made in

185. The need to consult in this and other situations may sometimes be obviated if the lawyer
possesses an expertise in the mental health issues relevant to the situation. In fact, some believe that
representatives for young children in maltreatment cases should be mental health professionals rather
than lawyers. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 4, at 1959 (proposing that specially-trained social workers or
other adults represent young children).
186. Note that, pursuant to the proposed standard, the information disclosed must be narrowly
tailored to meet the purpose of the disclosure. Here, for example, subpoenaing educational and
medical records, redacting them, and showing them to the expert, may very well be sufficient.
187. See supraPart I.C for a discussion of the "Jason S." example.
188. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1017(1)(a) (McKinney 1999) (directing local commissioner of
social service to locate and inform relatives and determine whether there is a suitable relative with
whom child may reside).
189. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of a lawyer's statutory requirement to represent a child's
best interests.
190. See STANDARDS, supra note 3, § C-2 (stating responsibility to conduct "thorough,
continuing, and independent investigations").
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order for the lawyer to meet her representational responsibility to advance and
assess Jason's interests in court, they are legitimate.
In contrast, however, under the proposed standard, the disclosure described
in Part II.B, supra, would not be permissible. In that situation, Jason's lawyer
disclosed to the parents' counselor information which included Jason's
communications to the lawyer about his reactions to seeing his parents fight.
Jason had specifically asked his lawyer not to tell anyone else about those
reactions, but the lawyer, believing it ultimately would be best for Jason if his
parents knew the effect their fighting had on Jason, disclosed that information to
the parents' counselor for use in therapy. Since there exists no representational
responsibility which requires lawyers for children to help therapists provide
better counseling to clients and their families, this kind of disclosure 91 would be
prohibited under the proposed standard, and Jason's confidentiality interest
would enjoy a much greater protection.
iii. The lawyer may disclose only the minimal amount of information
necessary to meet that responsibility...
Lawyers for diminished capacity clients must ensure that disclosure, even
when necessary to meet a representational responsibility, is done in a manner
which respects their child clients' developing interest in confidentiality.
Narrowing the scope of information disclosed solely to that which is necessary
for effective consultation is the simplest way of showing that respect. Otherwise,
a child client who develops an understanding of, and interest in, confidentiality
may feel much more reluctant to share information and seek counsel from his
lawyer when he sees how carelessly the lawyer previously has treated
information about him and his case. Many practical mechanisms exist to help
attorneys limit the amount of information they disclose, and the subsequent
exposure of that information, while still obtaining sufficiently informed
consultation. Some mechanisms, such as the redaction of all unnecessary
identifying information, are simple and effective at limiting the exposure of
confidential information. In the case of Jason S., for example, the lawyer seeks
input from a mental health professional on what services should be provided to
Jason and his family. The lawyer should be able to get that input without
disclosing much, if any, identifying information about Jason's case. Merely by
explaining the nature and frequency of the drug use and of the domestic violence
incidents, the lawyer may very well be able to provide sufficient information for
the mental health consultant to help recommend the appropriate services for
Jason.
Lawyers for children also should consider methods of minimizing the need
for disclosure altogether. For example, whenever possible, children's lawyers

191. While advocating for the best interests of a child client may be a legal responsibility in many
jurisdictions, see supra Part I.B, there is no authority or mandate which extends this duty beyond the
legal arena. In this instance, the decision about what information should be disclosed to the parents'
therapist is clearly outside the legal arena.

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

should engage in training on mental health issues relevant to their practice. 92
Mental health training would minimize conflicts with the confidentiality duty
because the increased level of a lawyer's mental health expertise on a specific
issue could at times obviate the need for consultation.1 93 Anything short of the
detailed, intensive educational training required of mental health professionals,
194
however, will not alleviate the necessity for consultation in all situations.
Mental health practitioners from the social work, psychological, and psychiatric
disciplines all undergo comprehensive training, and the level of expertise which a
lawyer could gain from occasional trainings is not comparable to that of such
practitioners, and certainly would often not provide the necessary expertise to
apply her knowledge in the context of a specific case. 195 In addition, the breadth
of mental health issues which can be involved in abuse and neglect cases is
extremely large. 196 To provide training in each of these issues would essentially
amount to a full-time course of study. 197 In addition, lawyers are generally
expected to be familiar with, and competent in, the legal aspects of their practice;
if there are other areas with which they must familiarize themselves in order to
sustain competence on the legal aspects of their practice, lawyers generally will
198
make use of experts.

192. Training on when children generally begin to understand certain types of questions, for
example, greatly assists lawyers in knowing how to frame appropriate questions for their client
interviews.
193. Such training also improves the representation provided by children's lawyers. See Andrew
Schepard, Law School Program Set to Improve Representation of Children, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 1, 2001, at 3
(describing some benefits of interdisciplinary advocacy programs).
194. In fact, even in those situations in which the lawyer had received extensive mental health
training, consultation would at times be needed. Even fully trained mental health professionals, for
example, will confer with colleagues who have an expertise in a specific issue on which the professional
needs guidance.
195. REPRESENTING CHILDREN, supra note 3, § 5-4(a)(2)(ii), at 137.
196. See, e.g., Martha Farrel Erickson & Byron Egeland, Child Neglect, in APSAC HANDBOOK,
supra note 1, 3, 7-12 (summarizing several studies which show long-term impact of neglect on
children's mental health).
197. A trained mental health professional, for example, can provide significantly more educated
insights than Roger M.'s lawyer can on the psychological factors relevant to the assessment of Roger's
"interests" on placement; similarly, a trained mental health professional is much more likely to be
aware of relatively new or innovative mental health treatment alternatives which the lawyer for Jason
S. might seek on behalf of her client.
198. Even if a lawyer does become familiar with extra-legal issues involved in her practice, she
would be irresponsible to consider herself an expert in those issues. A medical malpractice lawyer, for
example, might become extremely familiar with a wide variety of medical terms, treatments and
practices in the course of her legal practice. She would be remiss, however, if she failed to consult with
a medical expert on her cases. Similarly, even if a children's lawyer became familiar, for example, with
the counseling and therapeutic services which children in the child welfare system often require, she
would often be remiss not to consult also with mental health practitioners, the real experts in those
areas. See REPRESENTING CHILDREN, supra note 3, § 5-4(a)(2)(ii), at 137 (analogizing to product
liability attorney facing intricate technological questions).
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iv. The lawyer.., must limit to the greatest extent possible the potential
exposure of the disclosed informationto individuals not covered by the
attorney-clientprivilege.
Just as lawyers should limit the amount of confidential information
disclosed, they should also limit the number of people to whom the information
potentially is exposed. Lawyers can to some extent control that exposure by
choosing judiciously which type of expert is consulted. Lawyers for children
maltreatment cases might consult essentially three types of mental health
practitioners: the retained mental health professional; the mental health
professional providing treatment to the child or family; and, the mental health
professional appointed by the court to evaluate the child. Lawyers for
diminished capacity clients always should attempt to consult with the mental
health professional whose role involves the least risk that information provided
in the consultation will be disclosed further.
Consultation with a court-appointed expert presents the greatest threat to
the preservation of confidential information. Court-appointed evaluators must,
by the very nature of their job, disclose information to the court. These experts
are appointed by a judge to conduct evaluations for the court of children or
parents, or to answer specific questions for the court, such as whether a child
should be placed in a mental health facility. Such experts are extremely useful
for judges, who can then base their determinations of what is in a child's best
interests on the opinions of these professional analyses of the psychological,
emotional, and other mental health issues involved. Information disclosed to
court-appointed experts is almost always included as part of written or oral
reports to the court, copies of which are routinely provided to counsel for
respondent parents and counsel for the child protective agency. Not only, then,
is confidentiality breached, it is breached to the very people from whom the child
might want most to keep information private-parents who have been abusing
him, or an agency that has the power to make decisions about his future with
which he disagrees. Consultation with such an evaluator thus poses the greatest
risk of exposure of confidential information.
Consultation with treating mental health professionals involves somewhat
less risk of further disclosure. Treating mental health professionals, including
therapeutic social workers, school psychologists, or psychiatrists at communitybased clinics, can provide extensive information and opinions about their
patients. Since these professionals generally have long-term, regular, intensive
contact with the children and adults they treat and counsel, they are often the
most informed and informative type of mental health consultant. Because these
sorts of mental health professionals are not retained experts, however, they are
not agents of the lawyer or client and are therefore not covered under the
attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. 199
Therefore, any
confidential information which is divulged by the lawyer to the consultant is at

199. See supra notes 26-27 for a discussion of the persons covered by the attorney-client privilege
and the work-product doctrine.

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

risk of further disclosure both because the information is subject to subpoena
and discovery, 200 and because the consultant will be bound by his own, rather
20 1
than the lawyer's, disclosure standards.
By contrast, communications with a retained expert can be protected from
further disclosure by the work-product rule, and thus offer the greatest
protection of confidential information.20 2 The work-product doctrine protects
exchanges of information between the lawyer and the retained experts from
20 3
discovery by other parties if the expert is consulted in anticipation of litigation.
Even this protection, however, does not safeguard the confidential information
completely. In every state, psychologists and psychiatrists are required to report
suspected neglect or abuse, and social workers are mandated reporters in most
states as well. 2°4 Retained experts are offered no special exemption. Any
consultation, therefore, even with a retained expert, subjects the information to a
risk of disclosure if it indicates any reportable new instances of abuse or neglect.
In the case of Roger M., for example, the lawyer represents a client who is
being subjected to beatings by his parents at visits supervised by his
grandparents. 20 5 The lawyer may wish to inform a retained mental health
consultant of the ongoing beatings in order to obtain a more informed opinion
from the consultant regarding Roger's placement and his visits with parents.
Once aware of the continued abuse, however, the mental health consultant may
have a legal obligation to report it. This reporting could lead to various
repercussions which might be contrary to the goals the lawyer might be seeking.
Many judges, for example, might remove Roger from the care of his
grandparents, or suspend all visitation between Roger and his parents, upon
hearing about the continued corporal punishment. Roger's attorney might have
developed a position contrary to those actions. 206 Therefore, although a retained
expert may be the best option, lawyers should be aware that even where a
consulting mental health professional is a retained expert, there are risks of

200. Because the mental health professional-client privilege is not valid in some family court
jurisdictions, see, e.g., N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 1046(a)(vii) (McKinney Supp. 2002), there is an even
greater risk of disclosure. If subpoenaed to testify, an expert in such a jurisdiction would be under a
compunction to answer questions asked, or produce documents requested, which might ordinarily be
protected by the privilege.
201. See supra note 17 for a discussion of the confidentiality obligations of mental health
professionals.
202. Unfortunately, retaining an expert is a costly proposition available to few attorneys. See
note 3, § 5-4(a)(2)(ii), at 137 n.19 (pointing out that the problem is

REPRESENTING CHILDREN, supra

exacerbated by low compensation of children's lawyers and calling on state legislatures to allocate
money for this need).
203. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87 cmt. a (noting that
federal and state rules extend work-product immunity to personnel who assist lawyer).
204. Zellman & Fair, supra note 26, at 451. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the duty to report abuse.
205. See supra Part L.A for a discussion of the "Roger M." example.
206. In fact, even the consulting psychologist might be recommending a position contrary to the
judge's actions. The judge's sense of the child's best interests, after all, is not necessarily informed by
the same factors as a mental health professional.
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CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE CHILD CLIENT

further disclosure of confidential information.
v. The lawyer must make a written record of any decision to disclose
confidential information, and the groundsfor that disclosure,so that the
client may review the disclosure decision when the client develops the capacity
to do so.
Even where the client does not, at the time of the disclosure, possess the
capacity to impart credible information or understand fully a promise of
confidentiality, the fact that most clients will develop those capacities must be
considered by the lawyer. As there is no way of predicting which clients will
remain in foster care long enough to develop the appropriate capacities, each
client must be treated as though he will develop them. A written record should
therefore be made of each decision to disclose confidential information and the
grounds for that disclosure so that the client can review the disclosure decision
when he develops the capacity to do so. While this provision will add a small
amount of paperwork to lawyers who are already frequently underpaid and
overworked, it provides two important benefits. First, it allows clients who have
the capacity to do so, to understand why certain decisions were made on their
behalf when they were younger. Many older child clients look back in
frustration on decisions that were made for them, failing to understand both why
and how those decisions were made. 20 7 Especially in the sensitive area of the
disclosure of confidential information, many clients may one day wish to
understand why a certain decision was made. Trust in both lawyers and the legal
system will increase if those frustrations can be allayed at least somewhat
through a memorialization of the rationale behind the decisions. Furthermore,
being required to memorialize the reasons for every confidentiality breach may
have the added benefit of encouraging lawyers to conduct more scrupulous
decisions about when to disclose confidential information. The requirement will
force lawyers to consider their child clients as they will be in the future: curious,
independent, and with the capacity to direct decisions both about the disclosure
of confidential information, and about representational goals as a whole.

207. Consider the following statements of three eighteen-year-olds who were at the time either
in, or recently discharged from, foster care:
"[W]hen you're young and you don't have nobody to explain nothing to you and they just go
ahead and make decisions for you then that discourages you so that when you're older you
don't feel like you have a say."
Chaplan, supra note 176, at 1769.
"[J]ust to [have the lawyer] go through it [the basis of the decision being advocated], I think
that helps a lot."
Id. at 1772.
"I only seen my lawyer when I went to court, basically, when I was a little kid. I didn't know
what was going on back then. They should have asked me more and said why they
questioned me so much, because I didn't know what was going on."
Id. at 1774.
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CONCLUSION

Children who are the subject of maltreatment cases benefit substantially
when their lawyers are able to consult with mental health professionals. Access
to the expertise of such professionals enables lawyers to adhere to the statutory
requirements, ethical mandates, and representation standards which set forth
their responsibilities and duties, and allows them to provide truly informed
representation to their clients. The conditions under which consultation is
ethical, however, are limited by the duty which every lawyer has to protect the
confidential information of her client. Lawyers for diminished capacity child
clients must find a way to fulfill their representational duties, but still honor the
important role of confidentiality in their practice. The best interests standard
currently used for most decisions by such lawyers on behalf of their clients fails
utterly to acknowledge in any way that the fact the confidentiality duty must, and
should, play a role in disclosure decisions. It is my hope that the standard
proposed here will ensure that lawyers for diminished capacity child clients make
disclosures to consulting mental health professionals on ethically permissible
grounds, and in an ethically responsible manner.

